French And British Foreign Policies In Transition
A book of generally splendid essays on differences and similarities in French and British foreign policies in the postwar era, after they had lost their empires and found themselves subordinated to the two superpowers and economically overshadowed by their former enemies, Germany and Japan. Both were former world powers, a fact that set them apart from the rest of Europe and, given their different policies toward decolonialization, from each other. The essays, almost all of which are co-authored by a British and French scholar, are shrewd, incisive summaries that analyze a wide range of issues. The two countries were closer than the often visible divergences would suggest (de Gaulle and what is called Thatcher's "Grantham Gaullism"); the different styles of formulating and carrying out foreign policies are related to the differences in domestic policies and traditions.
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