Appraises (1) the admirable wisdom of detached watchfulness in reacting to the communist collapse, the end of the Cold War and the onset of German unification (2) the skilfull management of the coalition against Iraq for the liberation of Kuwait (3) the predominantly economic character of US foreign policy interests for the future
Michael Mandelbaum is the Christian Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, and the director of the project on East-West relations at the Council on Foreign Relations.
In 1989 the greatest geopolitical windfall in the history of American foreign policy fell into George Bush's lap. In a mere six months the communist regimes of eastern Europe collapsed, giving the West a sudden, sweeping and entirely unexpected victory in its great global conflict against the Soviet Union. Between July and December of 1989 Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania ousted communist leaders. Their new governments each proclaimed a commitment to democratic politics and market economics, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Europe began. All this happened without the West firing a single shot.
The revolutions in eastern Europe ended the Cold War by sweeping away the basic cause of the conflict between the two great global rivals: the Soviet European empire. They did so on George Bush's watch, a term that seems quite appropriate. As the revolutions occurred, he and his associates were more spectators than participants-a bit confused, generally approving, but above all passive. The president kept the United States in the background. In response to the most important international events of the second half of the twentieth century, the White House offered no soaring rhetoric, no grand gestures, no bold new programs. This approach served America's interests well. Events were moving in a favorable direction; staying in the background, taking care not to insert the United States into the middle of things, was the proper course of action. The qualities most characteristic of the Bush presidency-caution, modest public pronouncements and a fondness for private communications-were admirably suited to the moment.
The end of communism in Europe need not have proceeded so smoothly. There were pitfalls and blind alleys, alternative policies that had serious advocates. The Bush administration Union, between collaboration and confrontation, was an important and underappreciated achievement of American foreign policy. If one of the tests of each presidency after 1945 has been the capacity to manage crises, the president deserves high marks for his policies during the six eventful months that may be seen in retrospect as the final crisis of the Cold War.
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The moderates have a mandate in respect of economic policy, but are vulnerable to the hard-line anti-Western radicals in respect of foreign policy. The USA can do little but be cautious so as not to endanger the moderates' position.
For over half a century Japan and Germany have been at the heart of America's international preoccupations. After a long and destructive war against both countries, the United States worked exhaustively to help its two erstwhile enemies recover and build democratic societies secure under the American defense umbrella. From the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, victor and vanquished moved to a more balanced relationship, especially in trade and finance. Today, in one of history's great role reversals, Tokyo and Bonn have become Washington's fierce trading rivals and also its primary bankers.
In the winter of 1980-81 I analyzed the question of American involvement in southern Africa in the pages of this journal.1 I discussed a set of concepts-"constructive engagement in the region as a whole"-as a possible basis for pursuing American interests in southern Africa. It seemed to me at the time that this phrase was self-evidently consistent with mainstream U.S. internationalism and essential to the very meaning of activist diplomacy.

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