William B. Quandt is a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution.
A year ago it was plausible to point to the declining salience of the Middle East in world affairs, particularly in contrast to the upheavals of central Europe. How, then, did it happen that in early 1991 the United States found itself at war with Iraq, with aircraft, carriers and some 400,000 troops in the Persian Gulf? And how did the price of oil more than double in the course of the past year?
The immediate answer to these questions is that Saddam Hussein of Iraq upset the patterns of Middle East politics by his reckless invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. But there is more to the story. The apparently frozen landscape of the Middle East-no progress toward Arab-Israeli peace, no economic success stories, no impressive strides toward democratization, no new and inspiring leaders-may have given a false illusion of stability; in fact it merely masked political currents with explosive potential.
Throughout the region one could hear voices expressing deep frustration with the failure of politicians to grapple with severe economic and social problems. No regime seemed immune from popular disaffection. Everywhere Islamic movements were trying to capitalize on these frustrations, sometimes with success, by sounding the simple slogan "Islam is the solution." It was hardly necessary to mention what the problems were-there were so many to choose from: poverty, injustice, cultural alienation, lack of respect for human rights, corruption, violence.
The Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza had already revealed the anger and frustration of Palestinians, especially the youth, with the existing order in the Arab world and with the daily irritations and humiliations of the Israeli occupation. But for all the enthusiasm unleashed by the intifada in its first years, few tangible gains had been made and Palestinians were openly debating the merits of reverting to a strategy of "armed struggle." Elsewhere in the region, notably in Algeria and Jordan, popular demonstrations shook the self-confidence of regimes that were struggling to prevent economic deterioration.
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