La Politique Americaine De Commerce Avec L'est, 1969-1989
Any serious study of American trade policy toward the communist countries has to take account of contradictions and inconsistencies, shifts in opinion and analysis, differences between Congress and the executive, divisions within the executive, changes in objectives from economic warfare and export promotion, disputes with allies, diplomacy versus public opinion and the never-ending game of "sending signals." Labbé condenses these matters very neatly, lays out some criteria and comes to the conclusion that, with all their weaknesses, export embargoes and the linkage of trade pressures with other tactics have been more effective than many observers believe. To sustain this view she naturally has to make some judgments about cause and effect and alternatives that not everyone will accept.
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The 1930s deserve their bad reputation. Unemployment, misery, for many people hunger and, for more, the lack of hope, went with all the other ills of the Great Depression. Then Hitler came to power and fascism around the world grew stronger. The invasions of China by Japan and Ethiopia by Italy, and the Franco rebellion in Spain that soon came to be seen as a kind of global civil war--all showed the way the world was going. Driven by economic pressures, the policies of democratic countries became more narrowly nationalistic; bilateral and preferential trade agreements increased and France, Britain and Holland did what they could to assert privileged positions in their colonies. Although the Soviet Union was hardly a worker's paradise, the very fact that it offered an alternative to collapsed capitalism stirred people's interest and the Kremlin had new cards to play with. The worried democracies, meanwhile, did little to check the rising strength of fascism and were led to make one concession after another. If the times had any redeeming feature, it was that they made people think.
The next annual economic summit is scheduled to be held in Bonn in May 1985. What follows is a more or less fanciful account of its proceedings--not a prediction of the eventual reality, but a depiction of where present domestic and international economic trends are leading. Foremost among these trends is the growth of the U.S. trade and budget deficits. Conceivably, by next May, the actors at the Bonn Summit will have seen signs that these deficits are being reduced. More likely they will not, and the Summit will open in full awareness of the dangers that these deficits pose to the global economy.
Business lobbyists are peddling wildly inflated statistics to claim that sanctions are used too often, but America cannot have a principled foreign policy without them.
