The Web Of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder
The Tito-Mihailovic struggle and Allied policies in Yugoslavia in World War II remain a subject of continuing fascination. David Martin, author of two previous books in defense of Mihailovic, has put years of research into this book, among the main contentions of which are that the office of Britain's Special Operations Executive in Cairo resorted to deliberate distortion and sabotage in order to convince London to abandon Mihailovic and embrace Tito; that one James Klugmann, a convinced communist and probable Soviet agent, played the key role in this deception; and that Churchill committed a colossal blunder in supporting Tito, paving the way for the communist takeover of Yugoslavia at the end of the war. Martin marshals a good deal of evidence, much of it previously unpublished, although the crucial SOE records remain sealed. In drawing their own conclusions readers would do well to keep in mind that Martin is an advocate, not a neutral investigator, and that the facts he has been seeking are those that support his case. Churchill's decision to support Tito, incidentally, was made on military grounds. It is impossible to prove that supporting Mihailovic instead would have had more favorable military results, or that British support of Tito was the crucial factor in his ultimate political victory.
Related
Astonishing events in Czechoslovakia were only the latest in a series of changes in the communist world that took the outside world by surprise. The thaw and Hungarian rebellion of 1956, China's break with the Soviet Union and immersion in internal convulsion, and even the rejection of Russian control in Rumania-all were largely unforeseen (with only a few exceptions) even by expert opinion in the West, Like military planners who prepare for the last war, commentators on communist affairs in their preoccupation with accounting for the last surprise have often left the public unprepared for the next one. The concept of monolithic totalitarianism, based on parallels between Hitler and the later Stalin, ill prepared us to expect rebellion in Hungary; preoccupation with the Sino-Soviet split (which was only belatedly thought to be important, and then rapidly promoted into being the controlling factor in the divided communist world of the sixties) distracted us from any expectation of liberal deviation in Czechoslovakia.
Peace in the Balkans depends on economic stability and prosperity for all. To overcome the legacies of failed economic reforms and ethnic strife, southeastern Europe needs nothing short of a European "New Deal." Sound money and free trade can take root in the Balkans only if the EU expands the euro and its trade arrangements to the region promptly, with no strings attached. But the EU's current approach, which attaches conditions to membership in its elite clubs, falls far short.
Somehow the Americans went from claiming they did not have a dog in the Bosnia fight to redrawing the map of the Balkans over Scotch with the ruthless Slobodan Milosevi,c. But the Dayton Accord that ended Bosnia's war has been oversold. It is the product not of Wilsonian idealism but of a reluctant realpolitik. Had Washington intervened in 1993, as Bill Clinton promised to, 100,000 lives could have been saved. Dayton has strengthened the two nastiest dictators in the region, Serbia's Milosevi,c and Croatia's Franjo Tudjman, and edged toward accepting the de facto partition of Bosnia. The violence in Kosovo today is a reminder of the costs of appeasing aggressors.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.