The decision of Turkish president Turgut Özal, to join the anti-Iraq coalition, was a political gamble, but is likely to produce long-term benefits to outweigh the substantial short-term costs of lost trade, diminished popularity at home and increased terrorism -- enhanced international respect, economic and military assistance, and improved chances of admission to EC membership. "Turkey has earned the right to join the EC".
Bruce R. Kuniholm is Director of Duke University's Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs and Chairman of Duke's Department of Public Policy Studies.
Turkey, a long-standing U.S. ally and staunch member of NATO, has played a pivotal, if at times delicate, role in the defense of Europe and the Middle East. Its value as a Western ally has hinged on its geographic reach: it spans two continents and two theaters of Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union.
In the first years after World War II, as the only Islamic country with a secular democratic government, Turkey was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet designs in the Middle East. Along with Iran, it provided a massive land barrier to Moscow's ambitions in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Later, as the threat of Soviet expansionism seemed to fix on Europe, and U.S. policy shifted from containment in the Middle East (under the Truman Doctrine) to containment in Europe (under the Marshall Plan and NATO), Turkey's main strategic role was increasingly seen in a European context: as potentially bottling up the Soviet navy in the Black Sea, tying up Warsaw Pact forces along NATO's southern flank, and serving as a staging ground for a counterthrust against the Soviet Union.
Underpinning Turkey's early role in the NATO alliance was the principle of reciprocity: Turkey would play an important part in the defense of the West, and make its facilities available, while the West would provide Turkey with a deterrent against Soviet attack, as well as military and economic assistance. Today Turkey's relations with its allies continue to be informed by the notion of reciprocity and are colored by shifting security concerns. The only difference from recent years is that, with the Soviet threat sharply diminished and Ankara having assumed an important role in the allied coalition against Iraq, Turkey's strategic significance is once again being assessed chiefly in its Middle Eastern context.
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Brussels has delayed a decision on whether to admit Turkey to the EU. This caution is wise: it may aggravate the Turks, but no one really knows what consequences accession would bring, and Turkey has yet to achieve Europe's economic standards. History suggests that open borders would bring a flood of Turks northward looking for better jobs--a negative development for all the countries involved.
Greece is adopting a more internationalist outlook, and Turkey will have to follow suit if it wants to be part of Europe. Business ties between the two are a good start.
The hope of joining the EU has driven major reforms in Turkey, including economic liberalization, human rights protection, and greater civilian oversight of the military. But these reforms have fueled suspicions among Islamists and hard-line army officers. EU membership would help Turkey become a successful Muslim democracy, strengthen it as an ally in the fight against terrorism, and foster liberalization in the Islamic world.
