The Broken Mirror; Reform And Reaction In Post-Mao China
Both of these are collections of essays on post-Tiananmen China. The essays in the Hicks volume are too brief and the introductions are long on indignation and short on insight. For sophisticated analysis, the volume edited by Baum is superior. There is an essay by Edward Friedman that aptly compares the difficulties of China's modernization to those of the feudal monarchies of eighteenth-century Europe and suggests that Leninism, far from burying feudalism in China, breathed new life into it. Baum, in a stimulating conclusion, says that "China's chaos-fearing leaders will . . . eventually fail in their bid to achieve order without opposition, affluence without openness, modernity without pluralism." Globalized markets, information flows and cries for popular empowerment have already rendered autarky, self-reliance and neo-Maoist ideological mobilization obsolete as development strategies.
Related
Since Mao Zedong's death in 1976, and particularly since the rise of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the post-Mao leaders of China have sought to develop a new strategy and new institutions for modernizing China. In the economy, they have sought a more decentralized, quasi-market socialist system better suited to Chinese conditions than the highly centralized, Soviet-type system they adopted in 1949. Perhaps the most significant step has been a de facto decollectivization of agriculture.
Since the end of World War II, there have been three watersheds in Sino-Soviet relations. In February 1950, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China formed an alliance against the West. In the late 1950s, there was the beginning of the historic split between them that transformed international politics. Then, in the early 1970s, there began the Sino-American rapprochement that, by the end of the decade, completely altered the strategic landscape and led to an incipient Chinese-American alliance against the Soviet Union.
Soviet options in East Asia are limited by the USSR's lack of economic influence, but Gorbachev's new flexible diplomacy has led to limited advances. Discusses current relations with China, Japan, and the two Koreas, noting that influence in the Pacific region's economy is likely to be marginal for the next few decades. Concludes that prospects are good for a reduction in tension in the region.

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