Congress And Nuclear Weapons
This careful examination of how Congress reaches decisions on major nuclear systems, including a clutch of specific case studies, comes to a conclusion that is a welcome antidote: "pork"-jobs in one's district-matters, and Congress gives presidents what they ask for, if they are determined; yet substance also counts. Indeed, "what best explains congressional decision making are the personal policy preferences of individual members."
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Once again there has been a long and bitter fight in the Senate over the President's nominee for Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Like Paul Warnke in 1977, Kenneth Adelman has now been confirmed, but by such a narrow margin--and with such substantial political baggage--as to cripple his ability to manage the agency and promote its objectives.
Ronald Reagan's dream never died; it only faded slightly. Star Wars is still with us in a scaled-back form. Although theater missile defenses -- popularized by the Gulf War's Patriots -- are now widely accepted, debate still rages over a nationwide system. Republicans worry about rogue states and terrorists with nukes, Democrats worry about angering Russia and violating treaty obligations, and neither side listens to the other. America is pouring billions of dollars into research and development, ignoring the fundamental flaws that missile defense has yet to overcome.
Before taking office, the new secretary of defense chaired a panel that warned that the United States would soon face a sneak attack in space. Rumsfeld was right to note that the country is more dependent on its satellites than ever before. But building antisatellite weapons will only trigger an arms race, increasing the danger for all sides.
