Moscow, Germany, And The West From Khrushchev To Gorbachev
Sodaro has his own way of interpreting Soviet foreign policy, seeing it not just as a reflection of great power interests but as a process in which domestic factors, differences among leaders and the interplay of ideas among advisers, diplomats, academics and journalists-"the secondary elite"-influence the decisions made and policies adopted. He identifies various schools of thought-maximalist, Europeanist, Americanist, Atlanticist-each of which has its innings as Soviet policy shifts over time. Whatever one thinks of this approach-and there is much to be said for it-Sodaro has explored and wisely used all relevant material published in Russian and German to follow the course of Soviet as well as G.D.R. policy on the "German question"; that is, first and foremost, relations with the Federal Republic. His book should stand for a long time as a prime source of information and reference on this central aspect of the Cold War.
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Russia's post-Soviet orientation is in serious trouble. The West does not want to see any structure in Eurasia that permits Russian hegemony, but abetting continued chaos in the former Soviet space is hardly in the West's interest. Central Asia and the Caucasus are rife with flash points that could ignite and draw in outside powers, and the presence of nuclear weapons raises the stakes even higher. The United States should support integration, not division. For its part, Russia should work with nearby countries to help unite diverse peoples in a stabler system.
Early on August 22, 1939, the world was startled to learn from an announcement in the Soviet press that German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop would arrive in Moscow on the following day to sign a nonaggression pact. Equipped with instructions from Adolf Hitler authorizing him to sign both a treaty and a secret protocol that would enter into force as soon as signed by the two countries (rather than when ratified later), Ribbentrop left for Moscow that evening. At the airport, the German delegation was met by deputy commissar for foreign affairs, Vladimir P. Potemkin, who earlier that year had declined an invitation to meet with British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax.
The USA and USSR share an interest in stability, in the survival of Gorbachev and his initiatives, and in the adoption of a gradual, multilateral approach to German re-unification. The US choice is between (1) using the CFE negotiating structure to "perpetuate and legitimize an Eastern alliance that is imploding" (2) forgoing any follow-up to CFE by letting events take their course. The former course is preferable, providing a security framework through which change in Europe can be managed.

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