The USA should not make the same mistake with Syrian President Assad, that it made with Iraq's Saddam Hussain. "Assad now needs US favor more than the reverse. Yet he will try to induce Washington to pay him for allowing himself to be helped; this must not happen. US-Syrian relations can prosper only if American officials adhere to positions that are morally grounded and politically sound".
Daniel Pipes is Director of Philadelphia's Foreign Policy Research Institute. This article is adapted from his forthcoming study for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Damascus Courts the West: Syrian Politics, 1989-91.
After thirty-five years of grim relations, Damascus and Washington are suddenly agreeing on a few things. Syrian and American troops stood together in the deserts of Arabia, facing down Saddam Hussein and calling themselves allies. Then the Syrian media toned down their habitually vicious anti-American rhetoric, and diplomatic contacts increased steadily. In July President Hafez al-Assad agreed, apparently without preconditions, to participate in an American-sponsored peace conference.
These changes, some of them quite abrupt, raise several questions: Do they signal a fundamental shift in Syrian politics or are they merely prudential? Has Assad undergone a change of heart regarding Israel or is he making tactical adjustments? Should the U.S. government build on this quasi alliance or distance itself from a brutal tyrant?
To answer, we begin with an analysis of Assad's character and an examination of recent developments that have affected Syria. Next we scrutinize Syria's key bilateral relationship-the one with Israel. Within this context, finally, we focus on American policy.
II
Like any one-man dictatorship Syria is dominated by its ruler. President Assad unilaterally issues the country's laws and makes most of the life-and-death decisions affecting the twelve million Syrians he rules. Understanding Syrian politics, therefore, means beginning with Assad.
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American peacekeeping turned into American bloodletting in 1983. More than any event since the war and oil embargo almost exactly ten years earlier, the October 23 suicide bombing of Marine headquarters in Beirut brought the Middle East conflict home directly to vast numbers of Americans stunned by the carnage that eventually claimed 241 lives--more casualties than in any other single incident since the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam.
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