The USA's success in organizing the victory over Iraq should not induce a false perception of the nature of US influence over Middle East affairs. This is set to become weaker than it has been, and US policy should make use of its current leverage to (1) lay a foundation for stronger UN influence in the future (2) construct a mechanism to restrict the flow of arms into the region.
Alvin Z. Rubinstein is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute of Philadelphia.
President Bush's triumph in the Gulf War is in danger of becoming a footnote in contemporary history, not the turning point it should be. His preliminary postwar efforts to establish a durable security system in the Middle East lack a strategic focus. America's readiness to resume arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the gulf emirates and the tentativeness of the arms control proposals unveiled for that region last May are more suggestive of past failures than future promise. The initiative of Secretary of State James A. Baker to convene an Arab-Israeli peace conference seeks again to arrange direct talks between adversaries, not to advance a conceptual approach for transforming regional conflicts. The vision that forged an international coalition and achieved success on the battlefield is not evident on the diplomatic front.
Opportunities to establish a stable regional order will not last long. Victory has left the United States the preeminent military power in the Middle East, as it did at the end of the Second World War. This time, however, American power is not as self-contained or rooted in a hegemonic economic position; it must rely on the political and financial support of other countries.
But neither is the United States constrained from proceeding along a new path, as it had been in 1945-48, because of its growing preoccupation with containing Soviet power, rebuilding Western Europe and deferring to the vestigial imperial pretensions of a depleted Britain and France. In the 1990s the United States may not be the dominant power it was in 1945, but relative to the other major actors in the international arena it alone is positioned, and perhaps only briefly, to shape the course of events in the Middle East for years, even decades, to come.
Just as the campaign to undo Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait could not have been mounted or carried to a decisive conclusion by any power but the United States, so too does the establishment of a system of security in the Middle East depend on U.S. leaders seizing the moment to pioneer an arrangement that will end the vicious cycle of wars and ever-increasing expenditures on arms, to ensure security for all states in the region.
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Gives an account of problems encountered by START negotiators in 1988, as minor issues about particular types of weapons turned into major issues. Notes that these problems will persist post-Regan and concludes that "before a new administration can pick up where the old one leaves off in START" it should (1) impose some order in the chaos of US thinking about ICBMs (2) decide whether there is a militarily-sound mission for nuclear-armed SLCMs (3) develop a realistic plan for strategic defense R&D.
Reviews inter-state relations and foreign-policy initiatives in the Middle East in 1988, with special reference to US interests. Covers (1) Israel-PLO-US negotiations (2) the Iran-Iraq war and the UN peace plan (3) the US experience in Lebanon and the Gulf (4) arms purchases and the escalation of the regional arms race (5) future US interests and US-Soviet collaborative efforts in the region.
Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control are at an impasse. Following the deployment in Europe of the first U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in the fall of 1983, the Soviet Union walked out of the negotiations on intermediate-range forces (INF) and refused to agree to a resumption date for the negotiations on strategic nuclear forces (START). Whether and under what conditions the negotiations will resume is uncertain.

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