The military technology which played such an important role in the US-led victory over Iraq was built and deployed during the 1980s, but "was largely conceived and developed during the 1970s". Explains and discusses the defence policy objectives and procurement priorities which launched this resurgence of US military technology -- the 'offset strategy', whose central concept was that of compensation for numerical inferiority through 'force multiplier' effects, chiefly in regard to C3I ('situational awareness'), defence suppression (EW) and precision guidance. The USA should take care not to nullify the offset strategy by wanton arms transfers.
William J. Perry is chairman of the firm Technology Strategies and Alliances, and co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control. He was Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 1977-81.
In Operation Desert Storm the United States employed for the first time a new class of military systems that gave American forces a revolutionary advance in military capability. Key to this capability is a new generation of military support systems-intelligence sensors, defense suppression systems and precision guidance subsystems-that serve as "force multipliers" by increasing the effectiveness of U.S. weapon systems. An army with such technology has an overwhelming advantage over an army without it, much as an army equipped with tanks would overwhelm an army with horse cavalry.
This new conventional military capability adds a powerful dimension to the ability of the United States to deter war. While it is certainly not as powerful as nuclear weapons, it is a more credible deterrent, particularly in regional conflicts vital to U.S. national interests. It can play a potentially significant role in deterring those regional conflicts that would involve the confrontation of armored forces (as opposed to guerrilla wars). With the increasing proliferation of modern weapons in politically unstable parts of the world, those types of wars might be expected to occur with increasing frequency. The new military capability can also serve as a credible deterrent to a regional power's use of chemical weapons. It should also strengthen the already high level of deterrence of a major war in Europe or Korea. The United States can now be confident that the defeat of a conventional armored assault in those regions could be achieved by conventional military forces, which could enable the United States to limit the role of its nuclear forces to the deterrence of nuclear attack.
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Nuclear weapons, as great enhancers of national power, are attractive to U.S. allies, orphan states left outside the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and hostile rogue states. The collapse of the Soviet Union has brought into the open the growing desire for nuclear status, which the United States will have to discourage through continuing diplomacy and security commitments. Thwarting rogue states like Iraq and North Korea may eventually require preventive war, though it might take a nuclear exchange for Washington to reach that conclusion.
Assesses the effects of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait on the unity of the Arab world, and the recognition among Arab elite opinion generally that US assistance will be necessary to advance Arab interests. Professor of Middle Eastern studies, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University.
Overview of events in the Middle East during 1991, and how the Gulf war outcome, along with the collapse of the USSR, affected the interests of countries in the region. Asserts that US foreign policy could have been more vigorous in restructuring the Middle East order: "it sought more to stabilize the old order than to remake the Middle East in its own preferred image".

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