The beginning of the attack coincided with the hoisting of the preparatory signal for 8 o'clock colors. At this time-namely 7:55 a.m.-Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, and within the next few seconds enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers swung in from various sectors to concentrate their attack on the heavy ships moored in Pearl Harbor. It is estimated that nine planes engaged in the attack on the naval air station on Ford Island.
At the time of the attack, our planes-patrol flying boats, float planes, and scout bombers, carrier type-were lined up on the field. These planes caught fire and exploded. Machine-gun emplacements were set up hastily and manned, although the return fire from shore on Ford Island was pitifully weak. Then as suddenly as they had appeared, the Japanese planes vanished. No further attack on this air station was made during the day. However, 33 of our best planes out of a total of 70 planes of all types were destroyed or damaged.
As soon as the attack began, commander, Patrol Wing 2 broadcasted from Ford Island the warning: "Air raid, Pearl Harbor-This is not a drill." This warning was followed a few minutes later by a similar message from the commander in chief, United States Fleet.
At approximately the same time that the Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, other low-flying planes struck at Kaneohe Naval Air Station on the other side of the island. The attack was well executed, with the planes coming down in shallow dives and inflicting severe casualties on the seaplanes moored in the water. Machine guns and rifles were brought out, and men dispersed to fire at will at the low-flying planes. After a period of 10 to 15 minutes, the attacking planes drew off to the north at a low altitude and disappeared from sight.
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The history of our first three months at war must be painted in somber colors. The United States Navy suffered the worst losses in its history. Guam and Wake were captured by Japan. In quick succession the enemy overran most of the Philippines, seized Hong Kong, swept over Singapore, principal bastion and base of the United Nations in the Far East, and reduced various strategic points in the Netherlands East Indies one by one. As these lines were written, the surging tide of conquest was nearing Rangoon, entry port for the Burma Road, and was imperiling India.
On 6 December President Roosevelt played his last card for peace-a personal message to Emperor Hirohito, begging him for the sake of humanity to withdraw the military and naval forces from southern Indochina which threatened the Philippines, Malaya, Thailand and "the hundreds of islands of the East Indies." Hirohito did not want war with the United States, but he wanted still less to lose his throne. Showa Restoration would have been turned into Showa Deposition if he had refused to go along with Tojo at this point. So he said nothing.
The periodic successes enjoyed by US cryptanalysts in breaking the Japanese PURPLE code could have made no contribution to advance warning of the Japanese attack, as PURPLE was used strictly for diplomatic, not military, communications. The attack was a deep shock to US intelligence, and "has taught the United States to gather more information and evaluate it better".
