The Nature And Practice Of Flexible Response: Nato Strategy And Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967
Events of the last two years have all but ended NATO's nuclear predicament-how to frighten Soviet leaders enough without scaring its own citizens too much-and so the time is ripe for taking stock. Daalder's richly documented and cleanly written history will stand as definitive until more documents are released. He breaks some new ground-about, for instance, the "mininukes" debate of the early 1970s-brings together strands of the story told in parts elsewhere, and does it all with a lucid understanding of the strategic differences that drove alliance members apart and the political stakes that pushed them together.
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The recent U.S. experiment in unilateralism has shown the limitations of "coalitions of the willing." Washington should reaffirm its commitment to the Atlantic alliance and act with others when it can, alone only when it must.
Long the bulwark of the transatlantic security relationship, NATO now faces a threat from within Europe itself. The proposed EU constitution makes clear that the new Europe seeks to balance rather than complement U.S. power-making European political integration the greatest challenge to U.S. influence in Europe since World War II. Washington must begin to adapt accordingly.
Site of post-WW2 tensions, Berlin now finds itself relegated to the margin of political and economic change across Europe. Even the FRG is showing less and less interest in Berlin's future. Nevertheless, NATO should not ignore it, but include it in a new vision for FRG-GDR relations and the ending of the division of Europe.

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