Informing Intelligence: Intelligence For A New Century
The author, who served on the Senate intelligence committee, is a spear-thrower from the political right, but some of the spears are on the mark. His book is part primer, part history and part polemic. It is a little scattered, and he finds it hard to wrench the analysis into the 1990s from his preoccupations of the 1970s-Soviet missiles and defenses against them. But American intelligence has become bureaucratic-for reasons good and bad. Its satellites are technical marvels, but it never managed more than a handful of spies in Russia. Its analysts are dedicated and thoughtful, despite Codevilla's shots at the CIA "old boys," but the tracks of all that work on postwar American foreign policy are meager. His prescription is unassailable-it comes down to "a few very good people"-but, alas, probably not in the end very helpful.
Related
Two new books on intelligence reform -- Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes and Amy Zegart's Spying Blind -- distort the historical record. A third, by Richard Betts, rightly observes that no matter how good the spies, failures are inevitable.
The periodic successes enjoyed by US cryptanalysts in breaking the Japanese PURPLE code could have made no contribution to advance warning of the Japanese attack, as PURPLE was used strictly for diplomatic, not military, communications. The attack was a deep shock to US intelligence, and "has taught the United States to gather more information and evaluate it better".
With the decline of the USSR, the US intelligence agencies are faced with the challenge of re-focusing their energies on a new strategic environment. In particular, they will need to adapt themselves to serve economic and industrial aspects of national security. A discussion of how this change of focus might be accomplished, and of concomitant organizational changes, including the creation of the new post of DNI (director of national intelligence).

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