Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control And The History Of The Cold War
Men invite war by fearing the weapons that deter it: so argues Glynn, an unabashed Reagan admirer who served that administration's arms control agency. The first chapter is his noted article on Sarajevo in The National Interest, which argued that war came in 1914 less because of mindless militarism than the opposite: British carelessness about the balance of power. Here he intends to provoke, and he does. During the Cold War "liberal pacifist" Americans bedazzled by the "arms control paradigm" nearly repeated Britain's mistake. Yet the premise that Western firmness would eventually cause the Soviet system to crumble underlay containment from the very beginning; later debates turned on how to balance firmness and risk. Most observers of all persuasions would concede that the Reagan defense buildup played some role in hastening the demise of communism (whether America could afford it without taxes to match is another question), but it will take Soviet archives, and better understanding of human personality, to know how much Soviet behavior responded to specific ups and downs in America's defense effort.
Related
The Clinton administration supports crippling economic sanctions that punish the Iraqi people but seems ready to live with the demise of international inspections to monitor Saddam Hussein's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Washington has it exactly backward. It should offer Baghdad a blunt trade: lightened sanctions in return for renewed, intrusive arms inspections. The sweeping sanctions regime does nothing to advance U.S. interests, undermine Saddam, or contain Iraq. Leaving Saddam's arsenal unwatched is folly. Better to have arms inspections without sanctions than sanctions without arms inspections.
The specter of weapons of mass destruction being used against America looms larger today than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis. The World Trade Center bombing scarcely hints at the enormity of the danger. America is prepared only for conventional terrorism, not a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons catastrophe. With the right approach and organization, however, the United States can be ready. Herewith a plan to reorganize the U.S. government to ensure that it can handle the threats of the next century.
After the Cold War, the demands on American leadership are no less stern than they were in Dean Acheson's day. Present again at the creation, U.S. diplomacy must pass a series of tests -- of vision, pragmatism, spine, and principle -- to build a foundation for a new world. This will mean encouraging democracy, stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction, working to shore up the international financial system, engaging Beijing, and standing up to Baghdad and Belgrade. But America needs resources to lead, and Congress has foreign policy living hand-to-mouth. America cannot afford to abdicate its world role.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.