The Need To Know: Covert Action And American Democracy
Spawned by the Cold War, covert action as a routine instrument of foreign policy may be suspect when the United States no longer faces an ideological adversary across the globe. A 15-member task force chaired by Richard E. Neustadt of Harvard recommends tight new restrictions, mainly that overt means to achieve the same purpose be thoroughly canvassed first, that private action groups come under the same accountability requirements as government agencies and, most important, that covert action be undertaken only in support of policies that have been fully and publicly articulated. Notable is the eloquent dissent of task force member Hodding Carter III, who calls the practice an "addiction" of the Cold War: "To continue covert action now is to admit that we have become what we have fought."
Related
Two new books on intelligence reform -- Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes and Amy Zegart's Spying Blind -- distort the historical record. A third, by Richard Betts, rightly observes that no matter how good the spies, failures are inevitable.
The periodic successes enjoyed by US cryptanalysts in breaking the Japanese PURPLE code could have made no contribution to advance warning of the Japanese attack, as PURPLE was used strictly for diplomatic, not military, communications. The attack was a deep shock to US intelligence, and "has taught the United States to gather more information and evaluate it better".
With the decline of the USSR, the US intelligence agencies are faced with the challenge of re-focusing their energies on a new strategic environment. In particular, they will need to adapt themselves to serve economic and industrial aspects of national security. A discussion of how this change of focus might be accomplished, and of concomitant organizational changes, including the creation of the new post of DNI (director of national intelligence).

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