"The mood of the American electorate radiates anxiety, mistrust, pessimism and an implacable determination to change the way things are done in Washington". This, and the end of the Cold War, are "likely to effect a major transformation of American foreign policy", in terms of shift from geopolitics towards a definition of the national economic interest and an enhancement of US industrial competitiveness. This is not simply a reaction to the recession, but a more basic lack of confidence in US economic management.
Daniel Yankelovich is Chairman of DYG, Inc. and President of the Public Agenda Foundation. His most recent book is Coming to Public Judgment.
Much has been written about how the end of the Cold War is reshaping American foreign policy. Less well understood is how this change interacts with an equally momentous change in domestic affairs—the buildup of a powerful anti?status quo sentiment among the electorate. The mood of the American electorate radiates anxiety, mistrust, pessimism and an implacable determination to change the way things are done in Washington. The energy generated by the convergence of these two powerful changes is likely to effect a major transformation of American foreign policy.
The mood of today’s electorate differs from that of previous presidential campaigns in the postwar period. Though unmistakably potent, it is easily misunderstood. The public mood is linked to the economic recession, but in an indirect way. Most observers oversimplify this cause?effect relationship.
Economists are thus bewildered by the public sentiment in light of the fact that, in objective economic terms, the present recession is less severe than that of 1981?82; fewer Americans have lost their jobs or have suffered as badly as in the recession of a decade ago. Yet the public is far more agitated now than it was then.
In his own analysis President Bush also ties this public mood too directly to the recession. He attributes his steep decline in the opinion polls to it, and he apparently assumes that once voters realize the recession is over their confidence in him will spring back to previous higher levels. But a careful reading of the public mood suggests this inference may be wrong. The more likely scenario is that, even if the economy picks up before the election, confidence levels in the president will rise only moderately and probably remain below 50 percent (in sharp contrast to the almost 90 percent approval ratings of last year).
The public mood interacts with the end of the Cold War to influence foreign policy. A better understanding of the characteristics of that mood and how it relates to the economy will throw light on its implications for America’s foreign relations after the presidential election.
II
Journalists invoke words like "anger" and "outrage" to describe voter sentiment. These words do apply to roughly one out of five Americans. But for the vast majority anger and outrage are not the dominant feelings. Most Americans are less angry than they are anxious.
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