"The historical nature and development of Finnish-Russian relations... should tell us not only some things about Finland but also some seldom-recognized things about Russian foreign policy under Stalin".
John Lukacs is Professor of History at Chestnut Hill College, Philadelphia, and author of several books including, most recently, The Duel. 10 May31 July 1940: The Eight-Week Struggle Between Churchill and Hitler.
Finland and Russia signed a friendship treaty in Helsinki on January 20, 1992, consisting of many clauses, including commercial and financial ones. More significant was the exchange of notes that same day. These certified the cancellation of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow on April 6, 1948. That treaty, the result of the Soviet victory in the Second World War, established the limitations of an independent Finnish foreign policy and, indeed, certain conditions of Finnish independence itself. That those limitations proved manageable and flexible was principally due to the moderation and wisdom of successive Finnish governments, including their recognition that—especially for a small nation—an untrammeled independence of foreign policy is a chimera.
Thus in 1992 the last outlines of the ominous shadow of Russian domination of Finland disappeared—75 years after the establishment of an independent Finnish state. It must not be thought that the present treaty was but another by?product of the Russian retreat from central and eastern Europe. Finland’s independence was achieved and secured, bit by bit, by its successive governments over the last fifty years. Long before 1992 the exercise of that kind of Finnish statesmanship was vindicated. This was not always understood in Washington—not by John Foster Dulles, who in 1954 proclaimed that during the Cold War "neutrality" for a nation was impossible and immoral; and not by John Kennedy, who in 1961 said to a Finnish diplomat: "What puzzles us Americans is why the Soviet Union has allowed Finland to retain her independence." There need not have been such puzzlement in Washington, but that is not the theme of this article. Its theme is that of the historical nature and development of Finnish?Russian relations, which should tell us not only some things about Finland but also some seldom recognized things about Russian foreign policy under Stalin.
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Early on August 22, 1939, the world was startled to learn from an announcement in the Soviet press that German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop would arrive in Moscow on the following day to sign a nonaggression pact. Equipped with instructions from Adolf Hitler authorizing him to sign both a treaty and a secret protocol that would enter into force as soon as signed by the two countries (rather than when ratified later), Ribbentrop left for Moscow that evening. At the airport, the German delegation was met by deputy commissar for foreign affairs, Vladimir P. Potemkin, who earlier that year had declined an invitation to meet with British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax.
The waning use of Russian in the old Soviet bloc is a gauge of the severity of the Soviet collapse. What is prized now is German and, above all, English.
Offers "an argument for the necessity of an historical perspective" in the analysis of Soviet conduct, tracing the competition between Soviet communism and Soviet state nationalism from 1917 to the present day, with Stalin's purges of 1937-39 seen as the turning point -- "the rise of a state, rather than party, bureaucracy". Soviet conduct since WW2 has been dominated by geo-political considerations, not ideology. The American perception of an ideologically-driven Soviet Union is dangerous.
