The Gulf War has affected regional political consciousness and undermined traditional percpetions, e.g. of pan-Arab unity and of the effectiveness of oil as a weapon. Its chief impact will be to force the countries of the Middle East into realizing that they must start to define their own security interests
Bernard Lewis is the Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern Studies Emeritus at Princeton University. This article is adapted from the 1992 Henry M. Jackson Memorial Lecture, delivered at the University of Washington.
In the period immediately following the ceasefire in the Gulf War many voices were raised saying, "Everything has changed. The Middle East will never be the same again; this is a new world, a new Middle East, and all the problems and answers are different." And then, when the new world order failed to materialize in days, or weeks or even months, many voices—some of them the same voices—were heard saying, "Nothing has changed. Everything is back where it was before, the same actors playing the same parts and acting out the same scripts."
Momentous events may happen quickly, as they surely did in Kuwait and Iraq last year, but some time is needed to understand the changes that events have revealed, accelerated or caused. By now it is becoming increasingly clear that there are indeed many changes in the Middle East, and that while these vary considerably in their scope, scale and range, few things and few participants remain as they were before.
These changes are related to two sequences of events: one short?term and regional, namely the war in Kuwait and Iraq; the other long?term and global, namely the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Some changes may perhaps be ascribed directly to these events; others—probably most—had been in progress for some time and were revealed, and perhaps also accelerated, by the cataclysmic events in the region and in the world.
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"The invasion of Kuwait and the Arab reaction to it marked the end of the period when Arabs maintained the pretence that they were part of one great nation". The utopian conception, that the Gulf Arabs will use their wealth to "transform the Arab world", is unrealistic, and the region "will continue to be marked by glaring disparities between the rich few and poor many, and among diverse national and ideological forces in competition for the soul of Arabism". The USA should foresee that its favourable position in the Middle East will one day come to end. "Washington might use to good advantage the comfortable period that is now opening up. If the United States recognizes the temporary nature of the respite it could start to practice self-discipline; it could develop alternative energies; it could conserve its resources, tighten its belt, and bring its financial house into order".
"The war in the Persian Gulf posed a major and untimely crisis for soviet foreign policy... At several points in the crisis it was uncertain just how firmly Moscow's principles of 'new thinking' in foreign policy would hold".
Jordan has carefully nurtured a reputation as the most consistently pro-Western Arab state. Thus, it came as a shock to many to find most Jordanians taking the side of President Saddam Hussein in the gulf crisis, and Western leaders are disturbed by King Hussein's reluctance to join forces against the Iraqi ruler.
