The Future Of Liberal Revolution
Ackerman, a professor of law at Yale, has been intellectually seized by the impact of the end of the Cold War on eastern Europe. 1989 should serve as the beginning of an era, he says, in which "liberals again walk the world with a sense of revolutionary opportunity." Yet the author fears that as America recedes from western Europe, Europeans will revert to mindless nationalism. It is the nationalist right in western Europe that is mobilizing popular support. And in eastern Europe, in the rush to build market economies, the former communist legal system has been amended but not fully overturned. Ackerman pleads for far greater attention to constitutional construction that will guarantee civil liberties. There is much to this argument, yet one senses its peculiarly American tone, without adequate acknowledgement of Europe's differing political and legal traditions.
Related
The Atlantic nations are moving toward a new security relationship which may in time involve the role of European strategic nuclear forces. We are in a period of widespread questioning of the nature of future American participation in the defense of Western Europe. In the squalor of American cities, the increased racial and social tensions of our society and the demands for a shift in national priorities away from defense toward domestic problems lie the seeds of change. If we add to these the economic recovery of Europe, the U.S. view that the allies are not carrying a fair share of their own defense, the balance-of-payments deficit toward which the U.S. forces abroad make a substantial contribution, the squeeze on the Pentagon budget, the tendency resulting from the traumatic experience in Vietnam to shed responsibilities, we find the ingredients of a reduced U.S. military involvement in Europe.
A New and contentious concept has seeped into the transatlantic dialogue in recent times. It has been suggested that the United States may "decouple" itself from its strategic commitment to Western Europe in the future, or perhaps is in the process of doing so now. The codification of mutual deterrence in the SALT agreements of a year ago, combined with the earlier loss of U.S. nuclear superiority, is seen as having considerably eroded the remaining credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe. Some go further to find in the agreements an implicit understanding between the two superpowers that neither will henceforth initiate the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances short of the direct defense of its own territory. Arid even thoughtful Europeans who still observe the litany of faith in the nuclear guarantee do so with diminished conviction and look for opportunities through coöperative European actions to compensate for a substantial degree of American disengagement.[i]

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.