Europe In Transition: The Management Of Security After The Cold War; The Future Of European Security; Southern European Security In The 1990s
Here we have three books with a total of 38 authors covering a spectrum of issues. Yet events are moving so rapidly that some of the key issues of the present in Europe-the destabilizing impact of mass migrations, Germany's difficulties integrating its eastern part, the breakup of Yugoslavia-are either not touched upon or only lightly addressed. That said, each of these books has considerable merit. The Jackson book, the outgrowth of a Committee on Atlantic Studies conference at the European University in Florence, contains interesting ideas on the future political and security structure of Europe and its relations with the United States. The Crawford work has more emphasis on the domestic sources of change, particularly the all important economic and social factors. And the Aliboni volume, put together by the Italian Institute for International Relations in collaboration with similar groups in Athens, Madrid and Lisbon, provides an important perspective on an often neglected subject: the consequences of the changes in central Europe and the former Soviet Union on the nations of southern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.
Related
A New and contentious concept has seeped into the transatlantic dialogue in recent times. It has been suggested that the United States may "decouple" itself from its strategic commitment to Western Europe in the future, or perhaps is in the process of doing so now. The codification of mutual deterrence in the SALT agreements of a year ago, combined with the earlier loss of U.S. nuclear superiority, is seen as having considerably eroded the remaining credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe. Some go further to find in the agreements an implicit understanding between the two superpowers that neither will henceforth initiate the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances short of the direct defense of its own territory. Arid even thoughtful Europeans who still observe the litany of faith in the nuclear guarantee do so with diminished conviction and look for opportunities through coöperative European actions to compensate for a substantial degree of American disengagement.[i]
WHEN the Western European Union was founded, and when the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO, there existed a uniform political concept which was supported by all partners in the alliance. On it was based the strategic concept, which in turn was the basis for setting force requirements that were to be built up and maintained by all the members. In the course of the last few years, however, we have seen a growing divergence of opinion on the basic questions of our common defense and strategy. By the time President Kennedy took office, the concept which had been in effect up to that time-namely the principle of massive deterrence and, should it fail, of massive retaliation-was no longer considered by the United States to be credible. Strategy was adapted to the development of modern weapons technology and flexible response was made the official and binding American military doctrine.
Are the bases on which Western security in Europe has rested since the Atlantic Alliance has been in existence threatened? Is it true that with the change in generations there is less and less realization in public opinion of the solidarity in destiny of the peoples on both sides of the Ocean? Is it likely that a substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces on the Old Continent could be imposed on the Reagan Administration by Congress? Did the President say what is in the plans of the Pentagon, or did he make a slip of the tongue, when he mentioned the possibility of a nuclear war limited to Europe?

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