"The unbridled assertion of collective rights, most often expressed as an aspiration to national self-determination, has become a major threat to global stability." U.S. foreign policymakers should emphasize individual human rights, which would release Washington from arbitrating conflicting national claims, consistent with America's own political traditions.
Robert Cullen reports from eastern Europe for The New Yorker and other magazines. His most recent book is Twilight of Empire: Inside the Crumbling Soviet Bloc.
The Costs of Vagueness
OF ALL THE NEW problems posed by the collapse of the Soviet empire none is more urgent than the need for Washington to devise what would be called, if Leninist jargon were still in fashion, a nationalities policy. As long as Moscow managed to smother ethnic conflicts within its dominions, the lack of such a policy hardly mattered. The United States could and did get by with indiscriminate support of virtually all grievances against Soviet rule, as long as they were couched in the rhetoric of human rights. Many of these were cases of individual rights—the right of Andrei Sakharov, for instance, to espouse views at variance with official ideology. But others were claims to collective rights, like that of Balts, Georgians and Armenians to secede from the Soviet Union and form independent countries. Now that the artificial order of Soviet power has vanished, the unbridled assertion of collective rights, most often expressed as an aspiration to national self-determination, has become a major threat to global stability. The United States can no longer afford to be vague in its thinking about individual and nationality rights.
The Bush administration, unfortunately, failed to realize the necessity for a new and precise policy. It relegated the new questions of nationalities to the area of human rights policy. And once the Cold War was over, human rights issues largely slipped off the administration’s agenda. This was a critical mistake. Not only did it contribute to the waffling evident in Washington’s approach to the Yugoslav conflict, but it also ignored the fact, proven in the Cold War, that the steadfast advocacy of a clearly defined set of human rights can be a powerful foreign policy tool—one that buttresses American leadership and undermines American adversaries. It also ignored the fact that whatever the practitioners of realpolitik might wish, a strong and bright moral component is essential to American foreign policy; without it, public support for foreign engagement tends rapidly to erode.
The challenge for the Clinton administration is to reformulate American human rights policy in the postcommunist era by defining the individual and collective rights the United States will support. Only then will American foreign policy have the requisite consistency of purpose to deal with the conflicting claims of emerging nationalities.
Dealing with Conflicting Claims
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
The Cold War culture of military restraint has given way to increasing atrocities. By remaining a passive witness in the former Yugoslavia, Central Asia, and Chechnya, the United States damages its moral economy. Yet none of these conflicts sufficiently threatens U.S. interests to rouse the nation to arms. The United States should therefore return to the calculating siege craft common before Napoleon, which stressed minimal casualties, partial results, and patience. Every war need not be a heroic national crusade.
The Congress of Vienna, the Treaty of Versailles, and the NATO-based containment strategy were three pivotal decisions in European diplomacy. Now there is a fourth opportunity to construct a lasting European peace through institutions, new and old. Foremost, NATO must expand, discussing openly which new countries to admit. The Partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe should coordinate human rights and civilian control of armies. Respect for human rights must extend to Russia, which is why the Chechen campaign has been so disturbing. To turn away from the challenge of this moment and freeze NATO would exact a higher price later.
The connection between American business and foreign policy is poorly thought out and mismanaged, on both sides. It is, however, vital to the national interest. For most of the country's history, foreign policy has reflected an obsession with open markets for American firms. At one time, protecting the interests of a company like United Fruit was synonymous with policy toward Latin America. While those days may be gone, commercial interests must still play a central role. Herewith, a framework for the second Clinton administration to guide cooperation between the government and the business community for the benefit of both.
