The Cold War has not ended on the Korean peninsula. U.S. policymakers must prepare now for a pending unification that - given the isolated, declining but perhaps nuclear-armed North Korean regime - promises to be both more complicated and dangerous than Germany's happy drama of two years ago.
Nicholas Eberstadt is a Visiting Fellow at the Harvard University Center for Population and Development Studies and a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
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Pacific powers would like Korea to reunify slowly, but the North is soon likely to implode, its economy deteriorating as its weapons of mass destruction accumulate. Rapid reunification would spur economic growth, as in Germany, and reduce regional tensions. South Korea's liberalization of its own economy and strengthening of its civic institutions will prepare it to assist the North. China and Russia may not go along, but Western governments should stop coddling Pyongyang. America should underwrite a united Korea's security, and Japan its finances.
Bruce Cumings' maverick thinking on Korea is now practically mainstream. This administration, which seems to have absorbed it, just might achieve what none of its predecessors could: the reunification of Korea.
The Clinton administration inherits strained bilateral relations with the leading powers of Asia and no coherent policy for the Asia / Pacific region as a whole. Trade, security and diplomatic style are the overarching challenges and on all three counts prominent Asians are worried. They fear a president bent on building trade walls, bringing home American troops and lecturing on human rights. Yet respect for the United States remains instinctive throughout the region, particularly given convincing progress in rejuvenating the American economy. Asia's quest for economic growth and more democratic government awaits leadership from Washington.
