Home › Features › Essays › Asia/Pacific Challenges

Asia/Pacific Challenges

Robert B. Oxnam
America and the World 1992
Summary: 

The Clinton administration inherits strained bilateral relations with the leading powers of Asia and no coherent policy for the Asia / Pacific region as a whole. Trade, security and diplomatic style are the overarching challenges – and on all three counts prominent Asians are worried. They fear a president bent on building trade walls, bringing home American troops and lecturing on human rights. Yet respect for the United States remains instinctive throughout the region, particularly given convincing progress in rejuvenating the American economy. Asia's quest for economic growth and more democratic government awaits leadership from Washington.

Robert B. Oxnam, President Emeritus of The Asia Society, currently serves as Senior Adviser to the Bessemer Securities Corporation and Bessemer Trust Company and as Senior Research Associate at Columbia University's East Asian Institute.

Login or Register to leave a comment.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.

The Rising Pacific

PRESIDENT CLINTON and most Asian leaders in government and business agree on one thing: the revitalization of the American economy is far and away the most important priority in U.S.-Asia/Pacific relations. But as the president begins to put together his economic plan for America, he faces several tough foreign policy challenges in the region. He inherits a sense of declining U.S. importance in Asian eyes and yet, perhaps ironically, a continuing Asian desire for a strong U.S. role and presence. He does not inherit a coherent Asia policy, but rather a series of strained bilateral relationships with several countries, especially Japan and China. To top it off some prominent Asians have already concluded that President Clinton is bent on building trade walls, bringing home the troops and lecturing about human rights. Instead of grand strategies what is needed from the Clinton administration is a fresh mix of initiatives-some that address Asia-wide concerns and others that focus on specific Asian countries. Emphasis on long-term results, rather than quick fixes, will contribute not only to Pacific stability, but also to Clinton's image as a global statesman.

In this respect the president confronts three overarching Pacific-wide challenges: regional and global trade policies, post-Cold War security issues, and U.S. diplomatic structure and style.

Trade Issues. Over the last fifteen years Asia has surpassed Europe as America's most important overseas trading region; some estimates indicate that Pacific trade will double the volume of Atlantic trade by the year 2000. Last year east and southeast Asia absorbed one-third of the total $422 billion in U.S. exports. And economic growth rates are world business news as newly industrialized economies (NIE) status spreads across Asia-Japan in the 1960s; South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1970s and early 1980s; Thailand and Malaysia in the late 1980s; southern China in the early 1990s; and many analysts put Vietnam, Indonesia and possibly the Philippines in that category by the late 1990s.1

This is a premium article

You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.

Related

Essay, Jan 1974
The Sinic World in Perspective
Edwin O. Reischauer

Christendom, Europe, or, more broadly, the Western world is customarily balanced with the Orient, the East, or more narrowly, Asia. This equation, however, is a false one. While the various lands of the West do in fact share a common historical tradition and in many cases similar cultural traits, Asia is divided into major cultural traditions as far removed from one another as from the West. There are vast psychological and cultural gulfs between the Arabic-Islamic world of West Asia and North Africa, the Hindu-Buddhist civilization of India and Southeast Asia, and the Sinic world of East Asia. But within each of these major cultural units there do exist psychological and cultural bonds in some ways comparable to those that unite the countries of the West. This article explores the nature and strength of these bonds among the countries of East Asia-that is, China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam-and the degree to which these affect their present political and strategic relations with one another and with countries outside this cultural grouping.

Read
Essay, Apr 1971
Image and Reality in Indochina
Harrison E. Salisbury

Reexamining the 30 and more years since Indochina entered the agenda of world problems one is struck constantly by the curious mirages, the discordance between image and reality which seem to persist not only in American perceptions of Indochina but in the evaluations by other great powers and the Indochinese themselves of the actual nature and goals of U.S. policy.

Read
Essay, Jan 1971
The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments
Earl G. Ravenal

Eighteen months after its enunciation at Guam the Nixon Doctrine remains obscure and contradictory in its intent and application. It is not simply that the wider pattern of war in Indochina challenges the Doctrine's promise of a lower posture in Asia. More than that, close analysis and the unfolding of events expose some basic flaws in the logic of the Administration's evolving security policy for the new decade. The Nixon Doctrine properly includes more than the declaratory policy orientation. It comprises also the revised worldwide security strategy of "1½ wars" and the new defense decision-making processes such as "fiscal guidance budgeting." These elements have received little comment, especially in their integral relation to our commitments in Asia. But the effects of this Administration's moves in these areas will shape and constrain the choices of the United States for a long time to come.

Read
Cover image

In the Magazine

March/April 2010, 2, 89
Essay
After Iran Gets the Bomb
James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh

Despite international pressure, Iran appears to be continuing its march toward getting a nuclear bomb. But Washington can contain and mitigate the consequences of Tehran's nuclear defiance, keeping an abhorrent outcome from becoming a catastrophic one.
Read