Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk Toward Peace
Article Summary and Author Biography
The American presidential campaign brought a hiatus in efforts to nudge Arabs and Israelis into the process of making peace. Recent months of direct but dilatory talks confirm that the rival parties in the Middle East are still incapable of moving forward without active prodding from the United States. The Clinton diplomatic team nonetheless faces more promising opportunities for Arab-Israeli understanding than previous American administrations. Through the process that began in Madrid in 1991, long-standing rigidities are being relaxed on all sides, and the global and regional environments make peace through compromise seem more attractive than continued enmity.
M. Graeme Bannerman served as staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and is a former member of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. He is now a consultant in Washington, D.C.
The New Framework for Negotiations
THE PURSUIT of peace in the Middle East has been a major item on the foreign policy agenda of every American president for the last quarter century. Over this time significant objectives have been achieved, including the 1974 and 1975 disengagement agreements and the 1978 Camp David accords. A comprehensive regional peace, however, has eluded and frustrated all who have pursued it. Therefore, when President George Bush announced a new Arab-Israeli peace initiative in March 1991, most observers viewed his proposal with understandable skepticism.
Taking advantage of changed international conditions and applying the lessons of previous Middle East peace negotiating experiences, the Bush administration initiated a process that altered the search for Middle East peace. The conference held in Madrid at the end of October 1991 established a new framework for continuing negotiations, replacing the 1973 Geneva conference as the benchmark for future discussions of Middle East peace. Despite Israeli and American elections, terrorist attacks and military raids, slow but significant progress was achieved, and the process begun in Madrid continued throughout 1992.
The ability of the Clinton administration to continue this process will have a significant impact on Middle East stability and, as a consequence, on American interests in the region. Those committed to negotiations are facing significant and growing challenges from those opposed. When the United States is not engaged in the search for peace, extremist forces gain strength.
Islamic extremists gain in appeal when the peace process appears stalled. Israel's decision in December 1992 to yield to public opinion and expel more than four hundred members of the Hamas faction of Palestinians only strengthens the hand of rejectionists. The more moderate Palestinians, as well as the PLO in Tunis, will steadily lose support if peace talks are seen as futile. Conversely, the ability of the Jordanians and the more moderate Palestinian leadership to continue negotiating will be limited by the growing influence of extremists.
The Clinton administration will be judged, in part, by how far it is able to advance peace in this tumultuous area.
Moderate Arabs: Breaking Away from their Past
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