It Takes One to Tango
Few Americans have had as extensive experience in strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union as General Edward Rowny. On the heels of a full military career, he was brought into the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (salt II) negotiations in 1973 at the urging of then-U.S. Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) and continued to serve, with interruptions, at a senior level under five presidents. But it was a stormy career, with a resignation in protest of the salt ii agreement during the Carter years and a departure from the Bush administration because he felt that his views were being discounted. The high point was during the Reagan period, when he headed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (start) delegation. Over the years, Rowny represented the conservative pole of the arms control debate and maintained a consistently skeptical attitude toward the aims of the Soviet Union. In this account of his government service he remains true to those views. He is also critical of what he sees as an American tendency to seek agreement for its own sake. This is a highly personal book, full of amusing anecdotes about the side conversations around the conference tables and in the halls of power.
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Discusses (1) the size of Soviet military forces (nuclear, naval, air and ground) (2) the ideological drive behind Soviet defence policy (3) possible future doctrinal developments. Since the late 1970s, changing technology has stimulated doctrinal change, giving rise to concepts of multi-front operations. But the doctrinal vision is at the moment unrealisable, and the Soviets may thus be seeking to reduce nuclear arsenals, so as to make defence of the rear easier in wartime. Concludes that, in the light of the continuing ideological basis of Soviet doctrine, the West must be careful not to underestimate the danger which lies behind the undermining of deterrence through badly-conceived arms control measures. Director, National Security Agency, 1985-88. Very useful analysis, recommended.
The Chechnya misadventure unmasked what Russia's armed forces have known for awhile: the heir to the once-vaunted Soviet military is in shambles. Years of cutbacks in Russia's military budgets, worsened by rapid inflation, have crippled morale, the development of new weapons, maintenance, and training. At the upper echelons, there is now an exodus of talented and experienced officers; in the lower ranks, desertion and draft evasion are widespread. Nevertheless, the Russian military has largely remained above politics and helped to stabilize the nation amid reform. The United States would do well to press for an honest and open military-to-military relationship with Russia. One day, a grave nuclear threat may require it.
Gorbachev's foreign policy has the same aim as that of his predecessors, with the addition of tactical flexibility and sophisticated PR, and he is in more control of it. Arms control policy is the one difference, but he will get nowhere as long as he insists on linking progress with the banning of SDI.

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