Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War: Guidelines for U.S. Policy
Nuclear weapons and strategy for their use were a key element of the Soviet-American confrontation. With the meltdown of the Cold War, what should be their role? To answer this question Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs brought together a group of young strategists, unfettered by past dogma but well-tutored in the discourse of the defense community. What emerged is an excellent and substantial body of fresh thinking about the proper role of nuclear arms, American in particular, in the post-Cold War era. Among the well-analyzed recommendations: U.S. targeting priorities should be shifted from Russian strategic forces and command centers to conventional forces and war-supporting industries, and most if not all nonstrategic nuclear weapons of the United States and the former Soviet Union should be eliminated through arms control agreements.
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Japan faces its biggest foreign policy challenges since World War II. Its leaders must snap out of their deep funk to confront a rising China, a nuclear South Asia, a United States increasingly prone to Japan-bashing, and a world in economic free fall. Instead of sulking over the growing closeness of U.S.-China ties, Tokyo should take the initiative and propose trilateral dialogues with Beijing and Washington on a range of issues, especially Asian security, nuclear disarmament, and macroeconomic policy. Japan's pessimism threatens the world's prosperity. If Tokyo stays on the sidelines, the world will pass it by.
Since independence, India's nuclear policy has been to seek either global disarm ament or equal security for all. The old nonproliferation regime was discriminatory, ratifying the possession of nuclear weapons for the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council while preaching to the nuclear have-nots about the virtues of disarmament. India was left sandwiched between two nuclear weapons powers, Pakistan and a rising China. The end of the Cold War has not ushered in an era where globalization and trade trump old-fashioned security woes. If nuclear deterrence works in the West, why won't it work in India?
The risk of a catastrophic exchange of nuclear missiles has receded. Yet the chances of some use of weapons of mass destruction have risen. Chemical weapons are a lesser threat, but more likely. A vial of anthrax dispersed over Washington could kill as many as three million. Traditional deterrence will not stop a disgruntled group with no identifiable address from striking out at America. The United States must pull back from excessive foreign involvements and begin a program of civil defense to reduce casualties in the event the unthinkable happens.
