October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan
The original edition of this book caused a sensation by raising the possibility that the Reagan campaign in 1980 might have negotiated with the Iranians to delay the release of the American hostages in Tehran. Before the book had even been published, partisans were taking sides and reputable news magazines were writing rebuttals. Eventually the House and Senate both launched investigations into the charges and reached the conclusion that there was no basis for most of them. Gary Sick has now written, for the paperback edition, a new preface and afterword that answer some of his critics. He seems to concede that there is no evidence linking George Bush to the possible deal, as he had initially surmised, but he still believes that William Casey was a likely conspirator. The House and Senate investigations have raised questions about the reliability of many of Sick's sources. While the author never claimed to have definitive proof, he did pull together a massive amount of circumstantial evidence, only some of which has been fully discounted by the congressional investigations. Given the nature of the case, it is hard to believe that we have heard the end of this affair.
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Nearly a quarter-century after the revolution, economic failure and a bankrupt ideology have discredited the Islamic Republic. Despite the attention paid to a clash between "reformers" and "conservatives" in the government, the real story in Iran is the growing discontent among the generation born after 1979. This "Third Force" will eventually topple the regime, and the United States should just watch and wait.
Anxious to turn back a string of recent victories by President Mohammad Khatami and his reformist allies, Iran's conservatives have embarked on a campaign of bloody repression. As the two camps battle for control of the Islamic Republic, the proper moves from Washington just might tip the balance. Modest engagement can help Iran's moderates help themselves.
Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that ensuring stability in the Persian Gulf is a vital U.S. interest. In its first term, the Clinton administration attempted to deal with the twin dangers of Iran and Iraq through a strategy of "dual containment" that kept both countries boxed in with economic sanctions and military monitoring. Dual containment, however, is more a slogan than a strategy, and far too blunt an instrument to serve American interests in the Middle East. The United States must employ a more nuanced approach, keeping the straitjacket on Saddam while seeking improved relations with Iran.

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