Giap -- The Victor in Vietnam
This is the story of the life of General Vo Nguyen Giap, the commander of the Vietnamese Army that defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu and then humbled the Americans. The author is a retired British army officer who had the advantage of several extensive interviews with Giap himself as well as with many veterans who served under him. The author attributes Giap's military genius to his balanced grasp of all the components of battle. Strategically, he showed grasp of the big issues; tactically, he was a master of guerrilla warfare--the most successful guerrilla leader of all time. And logistically, he was brilliant both at Dien Bien Phu and in establishing the Ho Chi Minh Trail, one of the greatest feats of military engineering in history. The chapter on "the Trail" is one of the more illuminating in the book.
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Despite the willingness of many Americans to settle for less than a satisfactory settlement in Viet Nam, and despite the possibility that events may foreclose the alternatives, it seems useful to examine just how "bad" a settlement we really are willing to accept and what the alternatives to such a settlement are. Despite heated discussion, some of the central issues involved in negotiations have not been debated-or at least not in sufficient detail and concreteness to make them clear. Indeed, so far each side is demanding victory on its own terms, the only difference being that we have offered North Viet Nam some face-saving devices, while Hanoi talks as if it is determined to humiliate us. Thus many people have dismissed these public positions as debating stances or meaningless rhetoric designed to raise morale or inspire confidence among allies and supporters-not serious approaches to settlement.
If you wish for peace, understand war-particularly the guerrilla and subversive forms of war." Thus runs an old maxim, as rephrased by Liddell Hart. It seems to me, as an outside observer and commentator (although I was involved in Viet Nam for nearly four years), that understanding the war has been the crux of the American problem and that the two great obstacles to understanding it have been the military and the liberals. Both have failed to understand what Mao Tse-tung calls "the time, place and character" of the war. Moreover, the domestic clash between the two within the United States has led to a polarization of extreme views, as between the doves and the hawks, for withdrawal or further escalation. Both these courses are, in my view, losers, as is the enclave theory, which is no more than an agonizing withdrawal-like Aden. The only difference between the two is that, by withdrawing, you merely lose, but by further escalation, you lose stinking. When I put this view to a leading member of the Administration, he said: "You mean, like barbarians?" It would be just that, and, when the conflict ended, the question would indeed be, in Senator Dirksen's words, "Where will you stand and with whom will you sit?" But the real question is: If these are losing options, is there a winning one?
The Clinton administration inherits strained bilateral relations with the leading powers of Asia and no coherent policy for the Asia/Pacific region as a whole. Trade, security and diplomatic style are the overarching challenges--and on all three counts prominent Asians are worried. They fear a president bent on building trade walls, bringing home American troops and lecturing on human rights. Yet respect for the United States remains instinctive throughout the region, particularly given convincing progress in rejuvenating the American economy. Asia's quest for economic growth and more democratic government awaits leadership from Washington.

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