Seventy years of Russian communism have left a demoralized work force. Generations of communist labor policies have instilled the nation with a "Gulag complex" and a stable of untranslatable terms for shirking work. Private initiative was sometimes dangerous and always unrewarded. Wage inversion led to the highest pay for the lowliest labor. And job dissatisfaction created moonlighting and enormous labor fluidity as Russians moved aimlessly from job to job. After all this, have the Russians forgotten how to work? The answer will prove crucial to Russia's pursuit of democratic capitalism.
Have They Forgotten How to Work?
OPTIMISTS LOOK to the market and democratic pluralism as the motors for driving Russia, the great outsider, back into the fold of "normal" economic and political development. Seeking aid and investment from the West, President Boris Yeltsin and his economists point to Russia's vast natural resources as collateral for loans and capital. Little is said, however, of another critical factor: the Russian labor force. While the technology can be imported, the essential human element cannot.
In city and country alike workers exhibit a long-suffering passivity and what the labor newspaper Trud called "a psychology of permanent dependence." With little pride in their inadequately remunerated work, and for years aware that they were anything but masters of their own proletarian country, the resignation of Russia's workers leaves them ill-prepared for the rough-and-tumble free market. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said at this year's World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, ''Without discipline and hard work we will achieve nothing. We cannot live as they live in the West and work as we work in Russia.'' For three generations a negative selection process systematically weeded out workers of the greatest drive, know-how and resilience, giving rise to a pervasive, cowed apathy and scheming work ethic, with the liveliest initiatives directed at seeking maximum personal gain with a minimum expenditure of effort.
Soviet communism has left a demoralized and dissatisfied Russian work force. What use will the world's poorest white workers make of new economic opportunities? Will they take advantage of novel freedoms and credits to hoist their country again to the respectable growth rates and vigor that it knew at the beginning of the century? Or will the Russian worker remain unproductive and unenterprising even in a democratic environment?
Collectivist Roots
EVEN BEFORE the 1917 Bolshevik takeover Russia's rural and urban working classes were conditioned by a traditional collectivist mentality. Individual effort and achievement tended to be regarded with suspicion. The peasant mentality was molded by the "mir," or commune, whose ponderous collective decision-making and parcelling out of land and jobs tended to induce mediocrity. That communal tradition--of "being like everyone else"--would later be revived by Stalin.
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In a number of countries (the United States, Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany to mention a few), it has recently been claimed in newspaper and magazine articles that unemployment has appeared in the Soviet Union. The authors frequently refer to the works of Soviet economists (my own included) in which serious problems are raised concerning our rational utilization of manpower.
Soviet options in East Asia are limited by the USSR's lack of economic influence, but Gorbachev's new flexible diplomacy has led to limited advances. Discusses current relations with China, Japan, and the two Koreas, noting that influence in the Pacific region's economy is likely to be marginal for the next few decades. Concludes that prospects are good for a reduction in tension in the region.
US policy to isolate the USSR from the world economy (such as the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment, the grain embargo, and the attempt to impede the Soviet-European gas pipeline) ought now to be discontinued, so that (1) Western businesses can discover the new Soviet market (2) an economic wedge can be inserted to prevent backsliding in Soviet political and economic reform.
