A Common Discontent: Revisiting Britain and Germany
Britain and Germany are beginning to have the sinking feeling that their once-promising zeitgeists-innovative Thatcherism and harmonious unification-have lost faith, energy and momentum. Revelations of Stasi sympathizers in Germany and star-crossed royalty in England are not helping.
To spend time in the United Kingdom and Germany in early 1993 is to become aware of levels of discontent unimaginable four years ago. Superficially, the disappointments appear to be linked to the worldwide economic recession, with levels of unemployment exceeding what dem-ocratically elected governments are supposed to tolerate. Except for those with a professional interest in arguing that the moment of recovery is at hand, there is little expectation that the happy days of 1989-minus the Soviet Union of course-are scheduled for an early return. Folk wisdom tells ordinary people that something more than an economic slowdown has occurred in what was once seen as a group of self-confident democracies on the road to making a new Europe.
This is not to suggest that the recession has not been serious, for Britain even more than for Germany. To have three million men and women unemployed out of a total population of some 57 million in the United Kingdom, with a million having had no work for a year or longer, is to experience the tragedy Margaret Thatcher imagined she had permanently overcome by her drastic and presumably effective free enterprise policies. The failure to make British industry competitive, productive and lithe, and its working population industrious, has deflated the most ambitious of the Tory Party's many well-advertised ideologies. The results of the recession are conspicuous, not only in the nineteenth-century industrial cities of northern England, but also in the home counties, in London itself: boarded-up, empty storefronts of a thousand high streets, homeless men and women sleeping in doorways off Fleet Street and along the Strand, widespread unemployment and underemployment spoken of in all social strata. It is particularly painful for the young, including many who are university graduates, and it generates a pessimism that is palpable. For the middle class the collapse of the real estate market has been an especially hard blow, made more serious by the fact that so great a part of a family's purported wealth is in its house and garden. In Britain the talk of "decline" is more pervasive than it has ever been, and not merely because of a devalued pound.
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For five years between 1925 and 1929, a certain portion of mankind, like those parched travelers in the desert who think they have glimpsed the oasis which will save them, believed the gate to lasting peace was at hand. This, as we now know, was only a mirage. But such a mirage had never before existed. People had never believed so fervently in the blessings of peace, or hoped so passionately that peace would be perpetual. Optimism rose to new heights. "Away with cannon and machineguns: instead, conciliation, arbitration, and peace!" At the meeting of the League of Nations on September 10, 1926, when Germany, recently defeated, was received as a member, the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand touched a new intensity of emotion with these celebrated words.
Offers a revisionist account of Munich, noting that Hitler regarded it as 'the greatest setback to his career'. Concludes that "those commitments, policies and alliances that can reasonably be expected to involve a country in a great war must be clearly articulated, understood at least in general by the public and perceived as truly essential to the nation's security".
The two world wars are the mountain ranges that dominate the historical landscape of the twentieth century. We still live in their shadows, in America as well as in Europe. Only with these wars did European and American history begin to coincide. The revolutions of 1820, 1830, 1848 and the wars leading to the unification of Italy and Germany marked the nineteenth century in European history, while the major events in American history were the westward movement, the Civil War and mass immigration. These events had certain transatlantic connections, yet not decisive ones. But in the twentieth century the two world wars have been the main events in the history of Europe and America as well.

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