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The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent

By John J. Mearsheimer
Summer 1993
Article Summary and Author Biography

Conventional wisdom argues that Ukraine should be forced to give up its nuclear weapons to ensure peace and stability in Europe. This is quite wrong. As soon as Ukraine declared its independence, Washington should have encouraged Kiev to fashion its own secure nuclear deterrent. The dangers of Russian-Ukrainian rivalry bode poorly for peace. If Ukraine is forced to maintain a large conventional army to deter potential Russian expansion, the danger of war is much greater than if it maintains a nuclear capability. U.S. policy should recognize that Ukraine, come what may, will keep its nuclear weapons.

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