The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent
Nuclear weapons are not always destabilizing, but for Ukraine to retain its vast arsenal of icbms would be highly dangerous. The circumstances that made the nuclear arms race stable during the Cold War are all absent in the Russian-Ukranian relationship. The nuclear balance between Russia and Ukraine will never be stable and, even if possible, the process of developing a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent is fraught with conflicts over custody, control and targeting. Accidents happen. In the uncertain environment of the former Soviet Union, allowing Ukraine to keep nuclear weapons is not worth the cost.
THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION
The case for Ukrainian acquisition of nuclear weapons rests fundamentally on two key arguments: first, Ukrainian nuclear weapons will promote peace and stability in a region that might otherwise be prone to conflict; and second, nuclear weapons will enhance Ukrainian security, providing an ultimate security guarantee for a state fearful that its sovereignty might otherwise be jeopardized by its enormous and potentially menacing neighbor to the east-Russia.
These are not trivial or easily dismissable arguments. They suggest that Ukrainian acquisition of nuclear weapons would produce desirable and beneficial security consequences for both Ukraine and the West. At first glance, they appear to provide a convincing rationale for Ukrainian nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, Ukraine should not become a nuclear power. Its own interests and those of the West will best be served if Kiev fulfills its oft-made pledges to join the Nonproliferation Treaty (npt) as a nonnuclear weapon state. The benefits provided by nuclear weapons are less certain and more conditional than the proponents of nuclear proliferation believe. When the costs and complications associated with nuclear acquisition are taken into account, the case for Ukrainian nuclear weapons is not compelling.
DO NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAUSE PEACE?
The case for nuclear proliferation rests on the pacific effects of nuclear weapons. As Kenneth Waltz asserts in the most famous advocacy of proliferation, nuclear spread "will promote peace and reinforce international stability." Because nuclear weapons greatly in- crease the costs and risks of war, they induce caution in the behavior of states and substantially reduce the likelihood of miscalculation. Wars between nuclear-armed states become simply too dangerous to fight. The force of this argument is greatly strengthened by the experience of the Cold War, in which the two bitterly opposed protagonists avoided war for nearly half a century despite numerous crises and provocations.
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America cannot avoid the dangers of small states with big weapons. U.S. policy must shift to deterrence, and only a conventional threat will be believed.
The time is ripe for a global program to reduce existing nuclear arsenals and prevent their further proliferation. The immediate tasks are to execute agreed-upon bilateral reductions in U.S. and Russian forces, assure that Russia remains the only nuclear weapon state of the old Soviet Union, and strengthen the international effort against the spread of nuclear weapons by tougher monitoring. Further steps to take under U.S. leadership include: adopting a "no first use" doctrine except as a last defensive resort to deter a nuclear attack; ending new weapons tests and phasing out safety tests by 1996; replacing the goal of strategic defense against missiles with a limited defense objective, and seeking Russian agreement on a warhead ceiling lower than the accepted range of 3,000-3,500. Effective future action will require a stronger policy of public explanation from American political leaders than ever before.
The nonproliferation regime is unraveling, and the Soviet rival is gone. The first goal of U.S. policy should be to keep America out of potential nuclear crossfire.

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