Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire
Remnick paints like Seurat. Rather than depict reality in straightforward analytical terms, he lets the shape of the Soviet Union's passing emerge from a mass of variously subtle and vivid dots of paint. The dots are the people he came to know during his assignment to Moscow as the Washington Post's correspondent from 1985 to 1991. He offers no conceptual framework for understanding the demise or Gorbachev's ultimately counterproductive effort to prevent it. Instead he lets the system's defects speak for themselves: the corruption, the reckoning with the Gulag, the trivial self-seeking of the apparat, the failure of social safeguards (for example, against homelessness) and much more. Even these are not described and weighed in a formal sense. The scale and nature of the corruption emerges from the tale of the Remnicks' nanny, who to bury her mother had to bribe everyone from the scheduler of funerals to the grave digger and, in the end, pay a sum equal to three months' wages. At the other end of the spectrum stands the regional Uzbek party leader who lived in a vast estate with peacocks, lions, thoroughbred horses and concubines. Thus each of the dimensions of the problem and of Gorbachev's answer is revealed.
With relish Remnick sets aside his journalist's neutrality, letting his emotions show throughout the book. As a result some of the people who represent evil, such as the dotty woman who does not so much embody Stalinism as pine for the man, are more caricatures than characters. Other more serious players, like Yegor Ligachev, when Remnick does not have much time for them, emerge as but half themselves.
Because he is such a fine writer, Remnick's tales and portraits are superb, and his book, from beginning to end, is as absorbing and entertaining for the specialist as the general reader.
Related
Gorbachev's new thinking is based on the belief that military power is not the only way to national security, and that there is a link between national and mutual security. The revolution in foreign policy thinking has been most profound at the level of policy concepts, and has been based on a realization that the real threat to the USSR comes from the weakening of the economy due to excessive military spending. Notes how the ideas underpinning the foreign policy revolution have existed for the last decade, and how the evidence suggests that the change is genuine.
Although Russia has projected itself more forcefully on the world stage since the beginning of the Putin era, its foreign policy still lacks any sort of grand strategic vision. Russian leaders continue to squabble over issues from NATO expansion to the world economy. But they are particularly concerned about Russia's identity, especially with regard to the post-Soviet states. If the Bush administration fails to devise a coherent policy of its own toward its former rival, it may face serious problems down the road.
