The Case for Optimism: The West Should Believe in Itself
The 20th century is over, and liberalism is again on the march. Hope makes more sense than fin de siecle angst.
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In the post-World War II era Americans have had a pressing need to come to terms with two critical international uncertainties: the future character of Soviet behavior and the likely shape of the nuclear danger. One recurrent idea that seeks to deal with these uncertainties is the notion that the United States is about to enter a period of peril because of an adverse shift in the strategic nuclear balance. The idea was most in vogue during the 1950s, but it has recently been revived as the "window of vulnerability."
Anyone wishing to master the art of confusing the issues, scoring effective but unfair debating points, and persuading others to miss the point, should make a study of what is widely accepted in the West today as enlightened, liberal discussion of international politics. Many politicians, some of whom perhaps agree with Wilde's proposition that to be understood is to be found out, make no sustained or imaginative effort at clarifying issues and explaining policies; and many intellectuals seem to consider marching, sitting, signing, visiting, going to jail and attending conferences (all activities which involve contributing prestige rather than intellectual talent) as more important political activities than attempting to raise the standard of public discussion. Debating devices which are manifestly unfair and which can do nothing but mislead are accepted as normal weapons of controversy, even by, and in fact especially by, those who make the highest moral claims for their case. Such techniques are not for the most part new, but it is interesting and perhaps important to see how they are applied to the facts of contemporary international politics.
The malaise that currently sours public opinion in Europe, Japan and North America is a manifestation of a crisis, not economic or political, but moral. The Gilded Age that accompanied the rise of new nation-states in the late nineteenth century ushered in a similar era of civic discontent. Today, exhausted by the end of the Cold War, people are disillusioned with great projects, skeptical of reform and distrustful of politicians. Populists fuel old resentments and xenophobia as they promise national renewal. This crisis of the democracies could lead to either an era of reform or disintegration. America can help prevent the latter.
