Expanding economic and media links are giving Asia what Asia historically could never give itself: a distinctly "Asian" identity. Far from a reaction to some Western impulse-colonialism or superpower imposition-the Asian consciousness is uniquely homegrown. It is animated by workaday pragmatism, the awakenings of a flourishing middle class and the moxie of technocrats. Though rifts in the region still exist, this new mindset gives Asians the confidence that-from human rights to security to political issues-they can fend for themselves.
SEARCHING FOR A NEW IDENTITY
Asia has at long last started to define itself. Asian consciousness and identity are coming vigorously to life. Western nations are increasingly impressed by the economic power and political gravity of the region. But Asia's success in the far-ranging and relative terms of global competition should not obscure those forces, in internal and absolute terms, now authoring a cohesive Asian worldview. The emerging Asian worldview is not one of imperialist pretensions, ideological fervor, totalitarian paranoia or superpower hubris-those ideas are viewed as retrogressive approaches that fractured the region for most of this century. The Asian consciousness is animated by workaday pragmatism, the social awakening of a flourishing middle class and the moxie of technocrats, although still tinged perhaps by anticolonialist resentment, racism and indifference to civil liberties.
This new Asian identity has social, cultural, economic and political implications. After decades of reserve on the international stage, Japan is now poised to assume a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, which would raise its diplomatic profile and influence. Efforts by Indonesian President Suharto to sustain and rejuvenate a post-Cold War version of the Nonaligned Movement bespeak a regional confidence and desire for autonomy. So does the conflict between Asia and the Western nations at the U.N. convention on human rights this year in Vienna. It made some participants, like Singapore Foreign Minister Wong Kan Sen, realize the extent of their Asianness for the first time. A few Asian nations, including Japan and Korea, supported the stand for universal rights taken by the United States and European countries, but India and the Philippines, two Asian democracies, were among those who argued that human rights must be considered in the context of the right to economic and social development. Charges of human-rights violations presented by other countries, they argued, were attempts to intervene in their domestic affairs. Most Asian political leaders maintain that the most desirable mode of democratization emerges spontaneously from economic growth, which sparks political consciousness among a middle class.
THE ELUSIVENESS OF UNITY
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Chinese foreign policy is now driven by China's unprecendented need for resources. In exchange for access to oil and other raw materials to fuel its booming economy, Beijing has boosted its bilateral relations with resource-rich states, sometimes striking deals with rogue governments or treading on U.S. turf. Beijing's hunger may worry some in Washington, but it also creates new grounds for cooperation.
No people is fonder of reading the future from the past than the Chinese, perhaps because no other people possesses a past which has for more than three millennia been as minutely recorded and as consistently glorious. The Chinese passion for their own history has bred a propensity for repeating both past triumphs and past mistakes. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese were in many ways in thrall to their own voluminous and detailed chronicles. When the intellectual sat down to the obligatory study of those chronicles, the profuse commentaries thereon and other quasi- sacred works of great antiquity, he was quite consciously performing an act of affirmation. He was at once affirming his personal commitment to the spiritual and political values of the great central tradition and renewing that two-thousand-year-old tradition. He was excluding any radical change in those values or the society based upon them, and he was severely restricting the possibilities of evolutionary change. Alterations did, of course, occur, some of them quite sweeping. But they occurred within the framework of the central tradition-or, at least, the Chinese could pretend that they occurred within that framework. When they considered the probable shape of the future they could therefore assume that it would, with some variations, repeat the past in perpetuity.
Never popular at home, Taiwan's independence movement has suffered successive electoral defeats and is increasingly irrelevant. The movement's demise and the rise of politicians promising greater cooperation with Beijing have removed the only plausible cause of war between China and the United States.
