South Africa stands as the world's first case of nuclear rollback. But the circumstances that led Pretoria to develop the bomb, the size and capability of its arsenal, who controlled it, and why the nation eventually gave it up have, until now, been largely obscured. Lingering questions about the past raise concerns about South Africa's nuclear future. Foremost among these are Pretoria's intentions for its valuable store of highly enriched uranium and what will be the ANC's nuclear agenda.
NUCLEAR POLICY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
South Africa represents the world's first instance of nuclear rollback, a state which has unilaterally and voluntarily relinquished nuclear weapons. President F. W. de Klerk declared to a special joint session of the South African parliament on March 24, 1993, that "at one stage South Africa did develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability," but "early in 1990 final effect was given to decisions that all the nuclear devices should be dismantled and destroyed." De Klerk's speech was the first official confirmation of what had long been suspected: Pretoria had actually developed nuclear weapons. Yet its larger significance derives from the country's unprecedented dismantling of a fully mature nuclear arsenal.
Despite de Klerk's exhortations about opening a new chapter of "international cooperation and trust," South Africa's nuclear past casts a long shadow. For some, de Klerk's announcement resurrected old questions about the country's nuclear behavior, reinforced current suspicions and raised fresh concerns about the country's plans for the highly enriched uranium (HEU) taken from the nuclear devices, as well as its adherence to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), development of export controls, and the prospects for an African nuclear weapon-free zone. As the country moves toward its first nonracial elections in April, these issues have direct implications not only for South Africa but also for the new government's relations with its neighbors and the West. The African National Congress (ANC), the United States and other key members of the international nonproliferation community continue to look for reassurance about Pretoria's future intentions.
SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR JOURNEY
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The two key issues are development aid levels and Pakistan's nuclear policy. On the first, argues that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, plus US budget constraints, indicate that "extraordinarily high levels of aid cannot and should not be maintained". On the second, asserts that the USA should, if it proves unable to persuade Pakistan to renounce its nuclear programme, lower its sights and settle for Pakistani agreement not to test nuclear weapons.
Freed from fixation on the struggle against the USSR, the USA "will need to think more broadly about the role of arms control in world politics", and will find itself sharing the same concerns as the USSR in respect of weapons and technology proliferation. Offers guidelines for US foreign policy (1) set realistic goals (2) co-operate with a reforming USSR while taking steps to reduce the risk of deteriorating relations should a counter-reformation occur.
The USA continues to under-estimate the danger to world security of continuing nuclear proliferation. As it normalizes relations with the USSR, the USA should "undertake a fresh assessment of the worldwide non-proliferation effort".
