U.S. intelligence must widen its focus from bipolar, military issues to economic, diplomatic and political issues in numerous regions. The international community should ban economic espionage, but U.S. intelligence should monitor foreign spying and share information with U.S. companies. Close observation of democratic transitions and human rights abuses could also aid foreign policy. Greater strategic and battlefield intelligence must accompany the revolution in military technology. Most important, the intelligence community can assure the quality of its analysts by opening its doors to academia and business.
Rep. Dave McCurdy, a Democrat from Oklahoma, served for ten years as Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.
COMING IN FROM THE COLD
During the Cold War, the purpose of the U.S. intelligence community was clear. American intelligence was a spyglass focused on the Soviet Union, keeping track of Soviet military research and development and watching Soviet activities throughout the developing world. U.S. intelligence caught other things only in its peripheral vision.
Now the Cold War is over. But its passing has hardly put an end to conflict, instability, or history. A dozen world hot spots clamor for attention, from Bosnia to North Korea, from Angola to Armenia, from Cambodia to Somalia. New areas of dispute--religious, ethnic, and national rather than ideological--threaten to replace the U.S.-Soviet standoff as the engines of world instability. At the same time, the United States has undertaken the herculean task of shepherding Eastern Europe and Russia through divisive and incredibly expensive economic and political reforms. In short, the Cold War has bequeathed an uncertain legacy to the economically and socially exhausted West; and if anything, U.S. intelligence must now come to resemble a wide-angle lens, focusing equally on a host of different countries and issues. In a time of geopolitical uncertainty and sharp cutbacks in U.S. defense spending, the flexibility and foresight provided by good intelligence may be America's most important foreign policy and defense asset in coming years.
In this new era, many U.S. defense doctrines and institutions must be reformed--and no reforms are more important than those focusing on intelligence.
While reforms in budgeting and organization are badly needed, thinking about U.S. intelligence requirements must begin with a fundamental reassessment of what the United States needs its intelligence services to do. What kind of information should they collect? To what uses will that information be put? We must redefine the nature of intelligence itself...
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The recent revelations of abuses by all our intelligence agencies and the multitudinous investigations of the CIA in particular have raised serious questions as to whether the United States can and should continue to maintain a capability to conduct any clandestine operations. Most of the horror stories have related to what is known as covert action-i.e., operations to secretly influence foreign governments, groups or individuals, often by illegal means. The Chile case is the most highly publicized. Almost none have involved the collection of intelligence abroad, but many of the techniques used in foreign countries have been occasionally practiced at home where the CIA cannot legally carry out such operations and where the responsibility rests with the FBI. As a consequence of these activities, there is widespread belief that the CIA should halt all covert operations and disband that part of the organization which has been responsible for carrying them out.
Although terrorism is a top U.S. concern, the State Department's annual terrorism report was riddled with errors. If Washington wants to win the war, it needs to get its facts straight.
Without basic overhaul of methods and personnel, the US intelligence community "will become an expensive and irrelevant dinosaur just when America most needs information and insight". There should be a shift of focus, from NTM (national technical means) to humint, and of expertise from military to commercial.

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