America cannot avoid the dangers of small states with big weapons. U.S. policy must shift to deterrence, and only a conventional threat will be believed.
Seth Cropsey is director of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation. He served in the Pentagon during the Reagan and Bush administrations.
The success of even an economic cripple like North Korea in building nuclear weapons demonstrates that the Clinton administrations nonproliferation policy is doomed. The policy ignores the obvious: the spread of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them has already advanced so far that the important question is no longer how to stop their proliferation, but rather how to prevent them from being used.
Three options exist for the United States in dealing with emerging nuclear states: to persist in its current policy, which uncertainly presumes that America will extend its nuclear arsenal to regional allies and retaliate in kind against any nuclear attack; to withdraw its nuclear protection and ignore the dangers of regional nuclear conflicts as being of limited strategic interest; or to try to deter a regional nuclear aggressor through Americas new conventional weapon technologies.
Only the third option offers a credible strategy that adheres to American interests. Since the end of the Cold War, the idea that the United States will use nuclear weapons to defend allies in peripheral regions has lost credibility and cannot protect either the United States or its allies from attacks by rogue states. Yet this is a danger, and a responsibility, that the United States cannot shun. As long as it remains the world's greatest economic and military power, America will be a prime target of ambitious tyrants with malignant designs.
Crossing the nuclear threshold no longer raises the prospect of engulfing the world in re as it did when the U.S. and Soviet arsenals faced one another. But a lesser catastrophe, such as the obliteration of a single population center, is now far more likely. This new risk arises both because of the spread of nuclear weapons and also the vulnerability of powerful nations to attack by smaller ones. U.S. policymakers must assume that at least one of the 20 countries now possessing or trying to build nuclear weapons will use them. When this happens, the international strategic landscape will be irrevocably transformed.
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Washington's plans for a national missile-defense system threaten the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- the foundation of international strategic stability.
The search for national security is a dialectic of hope and fear. Fear of war spawns demand for weapons; hope for peace feeds demand to control those weapons. Judging by the rampant growth of weaponry in modern times, fear is more fruitful than hope. If foreign policy is the management of contradictions, national security policy requires a synthesis of hope and fear, a prudent blend of arms and arms control.
Ten years after the end of the Cold War, nuclear danger is rising. Despite the end of the struggle in whose name the great nuclear arsenals were built, Washington now seeks to stop proliferation while holding on to its own arsenal indefinitely. But as nuclear restrictions falter -- battered by India's and Pakistan's tests, Iraq's defiance, North Korea's missiles, and the U.S. missile-defense plan -- the absence of a middle ground becomes stark. Holding on to nuclear arms is not a deterrent but a "proliferant" that goads others to join the club. Arms control has become a way of avoiding a fateful choice: a world of uncontrolled proliferation or a world with no nuclear weapons at all.

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