China's economic "boom" is more mirage than miracle, and rosy predictions are based on its neighbors' successes not Beijing's ability to sustain growth. The regime is more akin to Latin America's hyperinflationary Peronistas than East Asia's ascetic militarists. Beijing has flunked the fundamentals of sound fiscal and monetary policy and proven incapable of accommodating the impulses of a free market. Inflation, speculation and lax regulation are fueling a bubble economy.
Richard Hornik, on leave from his post as Senior Correspondent for Time magazine, is currently Journalist-in-Residence at the East-West Center in Honolulu. He was formerly Times Bureau Chief in Beijing (1985-87) and Hong Kong (1991-93).
BEIJING HAS FLUNKED THE FUNDAMENTALS
Part of the problem of analyzing China has long been that any critical view is seen as anti-Chinese. Simply to question the accomplishments of a 4,000-year-old civilization is taken as evidence of bias and, generally speaking, broad-gauge attacks on China’s ancient political culture, particularly by foreigners, are dismissed out of hand. That said, even those most optimistic about the Chinese economic "miracle" should take a careful look at the present regime’s track record before making sweeping predictions about China’s future economic growth.
In the long debate over the best political and economic path to modernization, an East Asian "model" has seemingly emerged overnight. In the eyes of many, East Asia’s success has proven that democracy, even pluralism, is a luxury to be indulged only after substantial economic progress has been made. Not only that, but economic progress itself is best guaranteed by a "soft" authoritarian regime. Only such a system, it is argued, can enforce the fiscal and monetary discipline that so often eludes democracies, which are forced to pander to public opinion or selfish interest groups. The benign intervention of wizened authoritarians can drive and direct economic growth, more easily allocate resources, push through austerity reforms that are beneficial in the long term but unpopular in the short, and all the while create an environment conducive to the growth of private enterprise.
The success of China’s neighbors has provided the rationale behind grandiose projections about the Chinese economy becoming the world’s largest in the year 2000, 2010, 2020, take your pick. This model is widely considered to provide grounds for the political legitimacy that Beijing will need if a new social contract is to be written with the Chinese people. East Asia’s success is also the primary argument against efforts to force China to liberalize its political system. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s senior minister, early last year warned the Clinton administration against meddling in China’s domestic affairs, saying, "I would put that as the greatest error that could be made."
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The West accounts for a disproportionate share of world income because it has already passed through capitalist development. Now that Asia is becoming capitalist, it will return to the center of the world economy, where it was in the early nineteenth century. Current currency crises are only blips on the screen. Asia's miracle transpired not because of shrewd industrial policy or great leaps forward but because countries attracted foreign investment and moved up the development ladder one rung at a time. But ahead lies the challenge, particularly for India and China, of establishing modern governments.
Over the past decade, China's leaders have pursued rapid economic reform while stifling political change. The result today is a rigid state that is unable to cope with an increasingly organized, complex, and robust society. China's next generation of leaders, set to take office in 2002-3, will likely respond to this dilemma by accelerating political reform -- unless a new cold war with the United States intervenes.
Deng Xiaoping has embarked on a risky strategy that pushes economic decentralization at a time when international forces are pulling China's regions apart. Provinces feud with each other over trade and with Beijing over taxes. East Asian neighbors, leery of a unified great power, exacerbate internal tensions by drawing China's fringes into competing economic spheres. Beijing is increasingly helpless to assert its control, and real power on a range of issues has already devolved to the local level. As the last of the old guard acquiesces in the move from Mao to market economics, China may not only be changing face but also shape.
