The Lagging Partnership

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IN SEARCH OF A JOINT STRATEGY

In August 1991, addressing a mass rally in Moscow in the wake of the failed communist coup, I officially stated something that had been just an idea before: the United States and other Western democracies are as natural friends and eventual allies of the democratic Russia as they are foes of a totalitarian U.S.S.R.

Indeed, partnership is the best strategic choice for Russia and the United States. Rejection of it would mean the loss of a historic opportunity to facilitate the formation of a democratic, open Russian state and the transformation of an unstable, post-confrontational world into a stable and democratic one.

Achieving these goals is of vital importance to Russia and the United States, which now share common democratic values. The national and state interests of both countries no longer conflict but complement each other on most international issues. The stage is set, then, for Russia and the United States to influence positively the course of world affairs, not through a condominium or imposed superpower priorities, but catalytically through a constructive partnership.

Yet despite successes such as the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the agreement to cease mutual targeting of nuclear weapons, and the cooperative approaches to several regional conflicts, partnership between Russia and the United States faces problems or fails altogether in some areas. In my view, this is due not to a wrong strategy, but to the fact that so far we have no strategy at all. While elements of cooperation exist on concrete issues, a mature strategic partnership has yet to emerge.

Partnership could run only against the interests of military-industrial groups and factions of government bureaucracies in both countries. These forces see themselves losing ground after the Cold War, and they are trying to survive by portraying their narrow group interests as national ones. They profit from the inertia of past confrontation and the inevitable difficulties of building a new Russian-American relationship.

The traditional American Sovietologists harp on the difficulties and unpredictability of Russia’s internal processes, which do not fit the usual Western criteria and stereotypes. Some analysts cannot accept the idea of a strong Russia, whether it be imperial or democratic. They propose that the West either take a wait-and-see approach or develop a new containment strategy.