Most of today's national and ethnic conflicts cannot be settled by a revision of boundaries. To prevent the cauldron of ethnic unrest from boiling over, a new framework is required where Wilsonian principles have failed. Self-determination must be supplemented by a new scheme that is less territorial in character and more regional in scope. A "states-plus-nations" approach would create special functional zones across state boundaries and national home regimes in historical lands. It would recognize the rights and status of stateless national communities and differentiate between nationality and state citizenship.
Gidon Gottlieb is Visiting Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, University of Chicago, and author of the recently published Nation Against State.
SELF-DETERMINATION RECONSIDERED
In the twentieth century, the great powers allocated territories and permitted the creation of new states on the basis of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. They invoked ethnic principles for the equitable distribution of territories. The central element in this approach was the division of territories. Yet most of the national and ethnic conflicts that remain today cannot be settled by changing the boundaries of states to give each national community a state of its own.
States bent on extinguishing smoldering embers of ethnic strife without the traumatic surgery of secession must make it possible for restive nations to carry on their life free from alien rule. The principle of self-determination must be supplemented by a new scheme that is less territorial in character and more regional in scope. Such a "states-plus-nations" approach requires functional spaces and special functional zones across state boundaries, the creation of national home regimes in historical lands, the grant of a recognized status to national communities that have no state of their own, the design of unions between peoples, as distinct from territories, as well as an approach to issues of national identity and rights that differentiates between nationality and state citizenship. A states-plus-nations framework does not preclude territorial compromises; it widens the menu of options when territorial changes do not suffice or when they are altogether ruled out.
The map of the world in the twentieth century changed after every one of the three great conflicts, the two World Wars and the Cold War. Yet only on one occasion, at the end of the First World War, did the great powers make deliberate changes collectively. After the Second World War and the Cold War, the powers could do little to determine the shape of the peace. When World War II ended, they outlined at Yalta the Soviet Union’s spheres of influence. When the Cold War drew to a close, they did little to direct the tide of the nationalist and ethnic forces that remade the map of Eurasia from Germany to Kazakhstan. The powers are now confronted once more with national questions that threaten the peace. A new framework is required where Woodrow Wilson’s principles failed.
BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL APPROACH
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The idea that every nation should have its own state has been the most powerful political force of the past two hundred years. Yet in an age of transnationalism and rising demands for sovereignty, many view secessionist movements as dangerous. U.S. policy harbors a prejudice against nationalism, without distinguishing between benign and malignant strains. Reflexive support for multinational political entities, especially despotic ones, is as misguided as automatically rejecting policies that would create new national homelands. The United States should no longer consider selective support of oppressed minorities as a policy of last resort.
The aftermath of the events of 1989 may have invalidated the simple division of the world, into democratic and totalitarian camps, which formed the basis of the Truman doctrine, "but another form of competition has been emerging that could be just as stark and just as pervasive... it is the contest between forces of integration and fragmentation". Forces for integration, or the breaking-down of barriers between nations which conduces to peace, include the communications revolution, growing economic inter-dependence and collective security. Forces of fragmentation, which conduce to war, include nationalism, certain types of religion, and socio-economic inequalities. Yet it is not clear that integrationist forces are generally benign, or fragmentationist forces generally malign, to US national interests, which has historically rested on the balancing of fragmented power. This should indeed remain the key principle of US and allied foreign policy, but henceforward the balance to be kept is not between entities, but between competing processes.
Foreign policy is not a game of chess, though it is often called that. There is no fixed board and there is no book of rules to say that a certain move will be successful or that a contrary one will fail. The treatises on diplomacy are guides to techniques. Books of etiquette that tell how to hold a teacup or fold a handkerchief do not help when the ceiling falls in the parlor or a baby must be delivered in a taxicab. So with diplomacy, the human factors determine whether an emergency is handled well or badly.
