Close economic cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians will only nurture Palestinian dependency and perpetuate frictions.
Shlomo Avineri is Herbert Samuel Professor of Political Science at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He is former Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In the complex transfer of power between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the world’s focus has been on the difficult, often violent issues of security that surround the creation of limited Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho. In this atmosphere, the economic agreement signed by the two parties in Paris on April 29, 1994, was hardly noticed. Amid the humdrum details, however, a conventional wisdom came to be shared by participants and observers alike, that a high degree of economic cooperation between Israel and the evolving Palestinian entity was a panacea for the region’s problems. Close cooperation between Israel and the nascent Palestinian economy has been universally heralded as a harbinger of a wider regional structure of economic cooperation, if not integration. The European Community is the model.
Like all conventional wisdom, however, this hypothesis should be tested, and the analogy with the European Community should be looked at more carefully. Even a superficial glance at the main ingredients of such a vision raises doubts about its applicability.
A COMMON MARKET
A Middle Eastern common market was a concept often used by the discussants during the Paris talks. It was premised on what appeared to be the obvious: shared economic interests, a high degree of cooperation and mutual interdependence, and a desire to raise living standards, especially among the Palestinians, all of which were viewed, almost without demurral, as the best guarantees of stability and peace in the area. Did not the French and Germans bury the hatchet, overcome generations of strife and build, on a foundation of coal and steel, a durable peace in Europe? If so, why not Jews and Arabs?
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Despite the hectic diplomatic activity of the last few months, peace in the Middle East seems as elusive today as ever. Sadat's dramatic visit to Jerusalem less than a year ago appears now as a semi-legendary event that must have happened eons ago, hardly related to the real texture of Israeli-Arab relations. Both sides have reverted to accusations and counter-accusations, questions and counter-questions, and appear to be bogged down in a procedural quagmire, with a harassed United States serving as a go-between, desperately trying to keep the flicker of hope from being extinguished.
At the heart of the conflict in the Middle East stand two irreconcilable ideologies: Zionism and the Palestinian dream of a homeland. Adherents on either side cannot accept the demands of the other, so perfect peace remains a fantasy. But another solution exists: to abandon grand plans and muddle forward. Piecemeal solutions can succeed where ambitious strategies have failed. Indeed, they are now the only option.
The end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf conflict sparked the Madrid conference, formal peace between Israel and Jordan, and some autonomy for the West Bank. But those days have gone. Even if Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu had lost the election, Arab countries would still be more preoccupied with economic problems, internal political challenges, and security threats from Iraq and Iran. But the end of the era of treaties need not be the end of the peace process. The plo should discourage violence against Israel, and Israel should disrupt Syrian support for Hezbollah. The United States must maintain the principle of territory for peace.

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