Arms and the People

Summary: 

Americans will readily endorse the use of force in foreign conflicts, if the conflicts impinge on domestic priorities such as oil prices, drug smuggling, and illegal immigration. In other cases, their definitions of "vital interests" vary widely. The last three engagements of U.S. troops - the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, and Haiti - underscore a common denominator: without a president who leads the nation by clearly articulating the principles at stake and the nature of the mission, the public is chary of taking action. Given President Clinton's approach, forbearance for a sustained Haitian intervention may not last long.

Andrew Kohut is Director of the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press, a public service arm of the Times Mirror Co. His is also former President of the Gallup Organization and founder of Princeton Survey Research. Robert C. Toth, a former foreign and national security correspondent of the Los Angeles Times, is a Senior Associate at the center. Carol J. Bowman, Director of Research at the center, assembled the survey data for this article.

THE MIND OF AMERICA ON FORCE

Since the end of the Cold War, the American public has shown three different faces with respect to using U.S. military force abroad: full support for the Gulf War, transitory support in Somalia, and no support in Bosnia. An examination of public opinion and media coverage of these cases provides a paradigm of the opportunities and obstacles faced by policymakers in seeking to assess the likely public response to American involvement abroad, as in Haiti. American attitudes toward these three crises suggest that the public will be clearly disposed to act militarily in two situations: if it feels America's vital interests are at stake, and if American military force can provide humanitarian assistance without becoming engaged in a protracted conflict. The peacekeeper role evokes an ambiguous response, but the public strongly rejects the peacemaker role.

The patterns of response suggest that early in a crisis the public will seriously consider the use of force, but that even when it feels the United States has a responsibility to act in its national interest, large percentages (sometimes majorities) will favor no action unless they are swayed by presidential leadership. All of these factors may be missing in the case of Haiti.

GUNG-HO FOR THE GULF

The Persian Gulf War enjoyed popular support because it was relatively cost-free and ended well. But even in the earliest stages of the crisis, long before the outcome of the war was certain, public opinion was positive enough to convince policymakers that Americans would support the war effort. Several reasons can be cited. From the start, there was a strong belief that the United States should play a significant role in helping defend the Saudi Arabian oil fields and evicting Iraq from Kuwait. The Bush administration did a very good job of communicating to the public the purpose of the Persian Gulf deployment, including its initial defensive mission and later offensive mission. Multilateral contributions of money and manpower boosted public support for a military option. The congressional debate and vote to authorize the use of force in the Persian Gulf fortified American opinion. Finally, extensive media coverage of the crisis, and later the war, solidified public opinion and kept public attention focused on the crisis.

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