Pundits point to the awesome growth of East Asia's economies and fret that the West cannot compete. But there is nothing miraculous about the successes of Asia's "tigers." Their rise was fueled by mobilizing resources - increasing inputs of machinery, infrastructure, and education - just like that of the now-derided Soviet economy. Indeed, Singapore's boom is the virtual economic twin of Stalin's U.S.S.R. The growth rates of the newly industrialized countries of East Asia will also slow down. The lesson here for Western policymakers is that sustained growth requires efficiency gains, which come from making painful choices.
Paul Krugman is Professor of Economics at Stanford University. His most recent book is Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations.
A CAUTIONARY FABLE
Once upon a time, Western opinion leaders found themselves both impressed and frightened by the extraordinary growth rates achieved by a set of Eastern economies. Although those economies were still substantially poorer and smaller than those of the West, the speed with which they had transformed themselves from peasant societies into industrial powerhouses, their continuing ability to achieve growth rates several times higher than the advanced nations, and their increasing ability to challenge or even surpass American and European technology in certain areas seemed to call into question the dominance not only of Western power but of Western ideology. The leaders of those nations did not share our faith in free markets or unlimited civil liberties. They asserted with increasing self-confidence that their system was superior: societies that accepted strong, even authoritarian governments and were willing to limit individual liberties in the interest of the common good, take charge of their economies, and sacrifice short-run consumer interests for the sake of long-run growth would eventually outperform the increasingly chaotic societies of the West. And a growing minority of Western intellectuals agreed.
The gap between Western and Eastern economic performance eventually became a political issue. The Democrats recaptured the White House under the leadership of a young, energetic new president who pledged to "get the country moving again" - a pledge that, to him and his closest advisers, meant accelerating America's economic growth to meet the Eastern challenge.
The time, of course, was the early 1960s. The dynamic young president was John F. Kennedy. The technological feats that so alarmed the West were the launch of Sputnik and the early Soviet lead in space. And the rapidly growing Eastern economies were those of the Soviet Union and its satellite nations.
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Growth is a beseiged deity. An increasing number of economists and policy- makers are becoming convinced that it is imprudent for a country to devote all its efforts toward maximizing the rates of overall growth-and wait for the benefits to trickle down to all sections of the population. Trickle- downism is thus on the wane. Developing countries are now being warned that rapid growth is liable to take too long to alleviate the miseries of the poor, and that for long periods rapid growth may indeed worsen the lot of large numbers-hence they should launch "direct attacks" on poverty.
Only a few years ago pundits were sure that the United States was losing to Asia and Europe and had to emulate their more state- directed economies to remain competitive. Now the conventional wisdom is that America is number one and that the rest of the world should adopt its more laissez-faire approach. In fact, neither caricature is right. Asia was booming and now it is slumping, but it will be back. Europe's underlying ossification will persist. But most important, while the U.S. economy is in a period of robust growth, nothing fundamental has changed. Its long-run growth rate has not accelerated, productivity has not risen, and the structural unemployment rate has fallen by one percentage point at most. Come the next recession, all this triumphalism will seem silly.
The Asian financial crisis had a side benefit: prodding the Japanese government to fix its economy. But as the sense of urgency eased, so too did the momentum for change. The Liberal Democratic Party, never a true champion of reform, now blocks deregulation from every angle. Wasteful public spending has created little but debt. And the public's trust in its government is all but gone. Recovery would require Japan's politicians to give up the many benefits of the status quo, which they will not do without a fight. So Japan's reforms are stalled permanently. Its economy is, too.
