Are Missile Defenses MAD? Combining Defenses with Arms Control
Will new U.S. missile defenses zap the nuclear stalemate born of mutual assured destruction? They are neither that good a shot nor that bad a strategy.
Michael Krepon is President of the Henry L. Stimson Center and the author of Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics.
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