Are Missile Defenses MAD? Combining Defenses with Arms Control
Will new U.S. missile defenses zap the nuclear stalemate born of mutual assured destruction? They are neither that good a shot nor that bad a strategy.
Michael Krepon is President of the Henry L. Stimson Center and the author of Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics.
Early in the Cold War, renowned strategist Bernard Brodie gave a chilling prognosis for the dawning nuclear age: "No adequate defense against the bomb exists, and the possibilities of its existence in the future are exceedingly remote." That strategic judgment -- that the vulnerability of superpowers would be pervasive and enduring -- has divided hawks and doves ever since. Hawks have sought to refute what came to be known as the principle of mutual assured destruction, both on philosophical grounds and through technological advances in offensive weapons and ballistic missile defenses. Doves have sought to cement the principle of joint annihilation as a cornerstone of arms control.
Each side has viewed the other's approach as fundamentally incompatible with its own. The purest expression of the hawks' camp was the Strategic Defense Initiative or "Star Wars," which was introduced in 1983 by President Reagan. The embodiment of the doves' camp has been the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which maintains nuclear threats indefinitely and rests on the paradoxical idea that more offensive weaponry does not contribute to greater security. The fruition of one approach has been regarded as the demise of the other.
Despite the end of the Cold War, this rhetorical battle continues within the confines of Washington's Beltway and Moscow's ring road because the debate over strategic vulnerability in the nuclear age remains unresolved. During the 1980s, the Star Wars battle was waged over astrodome defenses of orbiting weapons that would protect entire countries against Soviet attacks. The battle line now forms over the issue of missile defenses for circumscribed areas -- troop concentrations, airfields, and ports -- against ballistic missiles held by worrisome Third World states. The Clinton and Yeltsin administrations are currently negotiating new ABM treaty guidelines to permit deployment of missile defenses such as the U.S. Army's Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system. THAAD has become the focal point of a high-stakes battle involving strategic doctrine, bilateral relations, global proliferation, arms reduction, defense budgets, and billions of dollars in contracts for defense companies. As usual, both arms control advocates and missile defense backers have developed zero-sum arguments that suggest -- wrongly -- that there is no middle ground between support for the ABM treaty and deployment of effective missile defense systems.
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The nuclear threat has been transformed since the end of the Cold War, but Washington's nuclear posture has not changed to meet it. The United States should scale back its arsenal while allowing limited nuclear tests, shaping its nuclear force to bolster nonproliferation without undermining deterrence.
The reelection of Ronald Reagan makes the future of his Strategic Defense Initiative the most important question of nuclear arms competition and arms control on the national agenda since 1972. The President is strongly committed to this program, and senior officials, including Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, have made it clear that he plans to intensify this effort in his second term. Sharing the gravest reservations about this undertaking, and believing that unless it is radically constrained during the next four years it will bring vast new costs and dangers to our country and to mankind, we think it urgent to offer an assessment of the nature and hazards of this initiative, to call for the closest vigilance by Congress and the public, and even to invite the victorious President to reconsider. While we write only after obtaining the best technical advice we could find, our central concerns are political. We believe the President_s initiative to be a classic case of good intentions that will have bad results because they do not respect reality.
Nuclear weapons, as great enhancers of national power, are attractive to U.S. allies, orphan states left outside the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and hostile rogue states. The collapse of the Soviet Union has brought into the open the growing desire for nuclear status, which the United States will have to discourage through continuing diplomacy and security commitments. Thwarting rogue states like Iraq and North Korea may eventually require preventive war, though it might take a nuclear exchange for Washington to reach that conclusion.

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