Europe's Map, Compass and Horizon: Where? Why? With Whom?
In Western Europe, there has been a cowardly inability to redefine NATO's role and no stomach for free trade with eastern neighbors. But there is hope if European leaders squarely face the issues. Which nations will be admitted into "Europe" and when? France and Germany must recognize that there is no alternative to the European Union, and European leaders must convince their electorates that the long-term benefits outweigh the near-term pain.
Dominique Moïsi is Deputy Director of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales and Editor in Chief of its Journal Politique Étrangere. Michael Mertes is Director of the Policy Analysis and Speechwriting Unit, Federal Chancellery, Bonn, and is writing here in a personal capacity.
Hopes for a Europe united by democracy from west to east are fading. They are being erased by the ongoing, if not expanding, Balkan war, unusually high sustained unemployment, and a loss of faith. Five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, European nations are united only by their identity crises: they share narcissism, self?doubt, and a weariness with democracy. In former Warsaw Pact countries, with the notable exception of the Czech Republic, ex?communists have regained power, although they are more "ex" than communist. In western Europe, with the notable exception of Germany, scandals have tarnished the public's belief in democratic principles.
Since the Pyrrhic victory of the Maastricht referendum in France in 1992 (an acrimonious campaign that left the country nearly deadlocked, 51 percent for the treaty, 49 percent against, and aroused skepticism among prospective member nations), Europeans seem more afraid of what they may lose to the European Union (EU) in terms of sovereignty and identity than comforted by their prospects for more opportunities and influence in the world. West European governments seem mired in technocratic, soulless discussions of ways to build on the three pillars of the EU -- institutional reform, economic and monetary union, and common foreign and security policies. Fixated on how to "do" Europe, they have lost sight of the moral values and fundamental cultural and political objectives that constitute the "why" of it.
Europeans are painfully aware that their priorities are increasingly divergent. Around France, countries to the south are looking across the Mediterranean to the Maghreb with a growing sense of vulnerability and fear. Countries to the north, around Germany, are giving priority to the enlargement of the EU in east?central Europe. On Bosnia, Europeans have exposed their divisions (rather than sending them), their lack of political will, and their failure to perceive the moral and symbolic cost of over-cautiousness in the face of suffering of other Europeans. They have not been able to count on America to stop the fighting. Worse, the protracted war has strained and divided the Atlantic alliance. Europeans are ultimately the only ones responsible for other Europeans. The cost of nonintervention and indifference is proving higher than that of political and military interference.
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The Clinton administration needs to lead Europe and expand NATO, but without harming ties with Russia. Washington should dispel the ambiguity created by its current waffling. The president must take a two-track approach: start the process of accepting Central European states into NATO by spelling out criteria for membership and sign a global security treaty with Russia. To make it work, Germany and Poland will have to reconcile, the West and Russia will have to soothe Ukraine, and the problem of the Baltics will have to be finessed. Only American leadership can help create a wider, safer Europe for the next century.
Site of post-WW2 tensions, Berlin now finds itself relegated to the margin of political and economic change across Europe. Even the FRG is showing less and less interest in Berlin's future. Nevertheless, NATO should not ignore it, but include it in a new vision for FRG-GDR relations and the ending of the division of Europe.
Germany's need for an extended nuclear guarantee inn the face of a still-powerful Soviet threat, and Germany's post-war history of a close security relationship with the West, provide compelling reasons for a united Germany to be a member of the NATO alliance. Neutrality "is potentially the most destabilizing of options". Rand Corporation analyst.
