No single successor to the containment doctrine could possibly guide U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. Instead, American policymakers must distinguish between the means and ends of policy and strike the proper balance between the contending schools of thought in each. The task is to fashion a sturdy intellectual framework for policy, one weighted in favor of American leadership and "augmented realism." But the drift toward short-term ad hocracy simply will not do.
Richard N. Haass, until recently Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is Director of National Security Programs for the Council on Foreign Relations. His latest book is Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post?Cold War World.
FROM CONTAINMENT TO CONFUSION
Senior Clinton administration officials are quick to point out that one reason for their foreign policy difficulties is that the world they inherited is a more complex place than what came before. Although this explanation exaggerates the simplicity and clarity of the past half century -- the applicability of "containment" was hotly contested throughout the Cold War, especially during the wars in Korea and Vietnam -- it does contain a kernel of truth.
Global changes have undoubtedly complicated the conceiving and conducting of U.S. foreign policy. Ours is a period of "international deregulation," one in which there are new players, new capabilities, and new alignments -- but, as yet, no new rules. This international flux is compounded by political anxieties at home. The public is motivated by a pervasive sense that domestic problems warrant the bulk of America's energies. Extensive media coverage and scrutiny have increased the pressure on the government to act while making acting more difficult. And the Republican control of both chambers of Congress that resulted from the 1994 midterm elections is certain to aggravate institutional friction between the legislature and the executive. The net result is that domestic support for foreign endeavors is contradictory, weak, and growing weaker.
In these unsettled circumstances, the Clinton administration has sought to articulate a new foreign policy doctrine -- a framework for international reregulation. Its principal attempt was National Security Adviser Anthony Lake's September 1993 statement that "the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement, the enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies." While arguably useful as a long?term vision, this statement falls short as a practicable doctrine, which, as containment did, must define both interests and intentions. Despite the administration's insistence, it remains unclear that "enlarging" democracy actually qualifies as a paramount American interest. In any event, the objective is difficult -- at times impossible -- to translate into immediate policy while the process of democratization works its uncertain way.
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The Cold War induced caution in nations that feared uncontrollable escalation. Now that confrontations are less likely to careen out of control, a new season of bellicosity is here. The U.S. military, trapped in a Cold War mindset, has failed to realize this. It is spending far too much on casualty-prone units in all the services, in an age when political opposition to casualties effectively makes these units unavailable for combat. The military should recalibrate its priorities and shift funds to weapons such as high-tech lasers, stealth aircraft, and cruise missiles that can make warfare less lethal for Americans.
President Clinton and the Republican Congress do not agree on much, but both want to give the Pentagon more than it dared hope for in the post--Cold War era: some $260 billion a year. The Joint Chiefs say the United States should be ready to fight two wars at once, but would this really take as many troops as they claim, and is it even reasonable to plan for it? Look around at what allies and enemies are spending. Election time, however, is almost here, and politics in the defense debate has seldom run higher. What makes no strategic sense is good on the hustings.
America has reached a tepid consensus that accepts a decline of U.S. power in the world as inevitable. Other nations, better judges of power, treat the United States as a hegemon. America should pursue a vision of benevolent hegemony as bold as Reagan's in the 1970s and wield its authority unabashedly. The defense budget should be increased dramatically, citizens should be educated to appreciate the military's vital work abroad, and moral clarity should direct a foreign policy that puts the heat on dictators and authoritarian regimes. Republicans are best fitted to carry out this foreign policy of national honor and elevated patriotism.
