Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy
A balanced and lucid survey of the role of Congress in U.S. foreign policy. Lindsay, a political scientist at Iowa, takes aim at both "irreconcilables," who think the congressional role has assumed imperial dimensions, and "skeptics," who discount Congress' impact on policy. The congressional deference of the 1950s for which irreconcilables yearn (or for which they yearned when Republicans controlled the White House) is a historical anomaly. Skeptics, by contrast, underrate the efficacy of Congress in criticizing and legitimizing executive leadership. The study displays an easy command of historical and constitutional precedent and, despite its slim size, is a comprehensive introduction to the subject. The conclusion -- that one cannot eliminate Congress' vices without impairing its capacity to act virtuously -- is sound enough but perhaps too sunny in a political climate where a weakened president provides a strong temptation for destructive partisanship.
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President Clinton has tried to pursue a foreign policy agenda even more ambitious than his predecessor's. But as international realities and domestic priorities become clear, he has been forced to retreat in area after area of policy. The resulting flips and flops of policy toward Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, North Korea, and China have undermined U.S. credibility. But more important, they risk making Americans turn inward in dismay, forsaking the prudent internationalism that has characterized American foreign policy since World War II. Let us abandon a kind of leadership we are not prepared to exercise on behalf of a world order the price of which we have no intention of paying.
The summer of 1969 has seen men on the moon and almost half the American Senate voting against a defense decision supported by two Presidents. In the summer pride of the moon landing it is not pleasant to turn the mind back to the terrible topic of nuclear danger. Yet the splendid technical achievement of Apollo contains its own reminder that similar skills applied with similar single-mindedness have now led the two greatest powers of our generation into an arms race totally unprecedented in size and danger.
Americans are not isolationist; they're uninterested. So foreign policy is neglected, presidents find it hard to lead, and the noisy few trump the quiet many.
